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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AMENDMENTS:
THE 1991 AND 1992 AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT*
STEPHEN T. MAHER**
1. INTRODUCTIONO VER the last two years, the Florida Administrative Procedure
Act' has been pushed and pulled by forces that have tried to
reshape certain provisions of the Act in different ways. Although
those efforts have only been partly successful, they have succeeded in
making significant changes in the Act. Even the efforts that have not
succeeded are important because they may be repeated, and that pos-
sibility raises uncertainty about the future of this basic document.
The Florida Administrative Procedure Act defines much of the way
that citizens interact with their government. Today, much of the day-
to-day work of government is done by the bureaucracy. The APA
specifies what procedures the bureaucracy must follow in making indi-
vidual determinations and broader policy decisions.
The kinds of concerns that tend to arise in the relationship between
the individual and the bureaucracy and the kinds of decisions that
must be made about the procedure that will be employed to govern
decisionmaking in that relationship are not hard to anticipate. There
will be concerns about maintaining efficiency in the decision-making
process while at the same time guaranteeing that agency decisions that
affect individual interests will be made fairly and accurately and will
be recognized as legitimate.2 To assure fairness in a system of agency
decisionmaking, some ground rules must be established to specify the
type of procedure that agencies must use to reach their decisions. The
procedure used in making individual decisions may differ from that
used in making agency rules, but, even if different procedures are es-
*© 1992 by Stephen T. Maher.
** Lawyer, legal educator, and Chair-elect, Administrative Law Section of The Florida
Bar; B.A., 1971, New York University, Washington Square College; J.D., 1975, University of
Miami.
1. FiA. STAT. §§ 120.50-.73 (1991) [hereinafter "the Act" or "the APA").
2. Efficiency, accuracy, and acceptability have been identified as the three normative re-
quirements usually identified in administrative procedure. Roger Crampton, A Comment on
Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REv. 585, 592-93 (1972).
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tablished, the same issues must be confronted and resolved in estab-
lishing each set of procedures. What agency decision making will be
open to participation? Who will be permitted to participate in the de-
cision-making process? What degree of participation will be permit-
ted? Answers to these questions must be clear and detailed enough so
that both the agencies and the public that is affected will be able to
properly order their affairs. The procedures created should reflect a
reasonable balance of competing concerns if the underlying principles
of efficiency, accuracy, and acceptability are all to be adequately
served by the procedural scheme.
The federal and state governments have wrestled with these ques-
tions for years and, over time, have adopted administrative procedure
acts that reflect what they believe is a proper balance between compet-
ing interests. In Florida we have given different answers to the basic
questions of administrative procedure than have other jurisdictions.'
Our APA is more concerned with limiting agency power and protect-
ing individual interests than is the 1981 Model State Administrative
Procedure Act (1981 MSAPA).4 Our statutory rulemaking procedure
provides more opportunities to prevent agency encroachment on legis-
lative prerogatives than does any other administrative procedure act
because, both in rulemaking and after rules have been adopted, rule
challenges decided by independent hearing officers are available to
test the legality of rules against the claim that they exceed delegated
legislative authority.5 In individual adjudications in Florida, with
some exceptions, formal proceedings before independent hearing offi-
cers are guaranteed every time an agency affects an individual's sub-
stantial interests if a material issue of fact is in dispute. 6 This
approach provides more protection for substantial interests than do
most other APAs. 7 In cases where no facts are in dispute, informal
proceedings are guaranteed. 8 This bifurcated approach protects sub-
3. For further discussion of this point see Stephen T. Maher, Patricia Ann Dore and the
Florida Administrative Procedure Act, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 953 (1992).
4. Id.
5. Only the Florida APA provides substantially affected persons with rule challenges of
this kind. Patricia A. Dore, Access to Florida Administrative Proceedings, 13 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 967, 1012 (1986) [hereinafter Dore, Access]. Other states have rule review, but they do not
use the Florida approach. Patricia A. Dore, Seventh Administrative Law Conference Agenda
And Report, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav. 703, 725 (1991) [hereinafter Dore, Agenda and Report]
(summarizing other state approaches).
6. SeeFLA. STAT. § 120.57(1) (1991).
7. "Most state APAs follow the 1961 MSAPA and the federal act by requiring a source of
law external to the APA to trigger the adjudicatory procedures spelled out by the APA." AR-
THUR E. BONFIELD & MICHAEL ASImOW, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 115 (1989).
Florida has rejected this approach.
8. See FLA. STAT. § 120.57(2) (1991).
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stantial interests while preserving flexibility. The 1981 MSAPA fol-
lows the Florida approach in this regard and provides for "several
classes of adjudication of descending degrees of formality and com-
plexity." 9 The Florida APA thus contains powerful rights designed to
protect the public against illegal or arbitrary agency action, but these
are the remedies the Legislature has determined are necessary to pro-
tect individual interests against unwarranted intrusion by government.
These different answers to traditional questions of administrative pro-
cedure reflect a distrust of administrative government that is unchar-
acteristic of other administrative procedure acts, but it is a distrust
born of our experience.l0
Recent legislative initiatives have attempted to push and pull the
Florida Act in different directions. The widespread perception that the
Legislature and the public needed better access to orders and rules-
the documents most likely to illuminate agency policy-drove the
changes to the Act adopted in 1991. Those amendments represent an
attempt to give substance to the longstanding requirement that agen-
cies create a subject matter index of their orders so that agency rulings
in individual cases will be accessible. That change is designed to per-
mit a better understanding of agency policy at the level of application.
The 1991 amendments also require agencies, in most circumstances, to
adopt their policies through the rulemaking procedures established by
the Act. That change is designed to permit a better understanding of
agency policy at the level of general applicability.
In the 1992 legislative session, the rulemaking provisions of the Act
continued to be a focus of attention. The Governor had voiced con-
cern when the 1991 amendments were being considered that required
rulemaking would place too much of a burden on agencies. He threat-
ened to veto the 1991 amendments, but withdrew that threat when the
effective date of the amendments was delayed until March 1, 1992, in
order to give him an opportunity to seek legislative changes before
that effective date." During the 1992 session, the Governor tried to
amend the Act in a number of ways, but with only partial success.
Another theme emerged in the 1992 Legislature, one at odds with
the fine-tuning of the Act that had been accomplished in 1991. A joint
resolution pr6posing a constitutional amendment to permit the legisla-
tive repeal and veto of agency rules did not pass, but found support
9. BONFIELD & AsImow, supra note 7, at 116.
10. Maher, supra note 3, at 953. For a discussion of the historical background of the pres-
ent Florida APA, see Symposium, The New Florida Administrative Procedure Act: Selected Pre-
sentations from the Attorney General's Conference, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 64 (1975) (including
six articles); FLA. ADMIN. PRACTICE, § 1.02, at 1-1 to 1-5 (Supp. 1992).
11. Ch. 91-191, 1991 Fla. Laws 1604.
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within the Legislature. 2 Also, more than two-thirds of the members
of the Florida House of Representatives cosponsored a bill that would
significantly changed the existing rulemaking system to provide
greater legislative involvement in rulemaking. 3 This bill did not pass,
but the disenchantment with the present system that it reflected was
surprising given the 1991 amendments. The 1991 amendments reaf-
firmed a number of the basic policy choices made in the Act and fo-
cused on making those requirements more enforceable. The 1992
session evidenced a different mood, although that difference was
given only limited expression in the legislation that emerged. It is per-
haps clearest in the parts of the new legislation that increased the
power of the Legislature's Joint Administrative Procedures Commit-
tee (JAPC) in the agency rulemaking process.
The compromise that was voted out as the 1992 amendments did
several things. The major 1992 amendments included changes to the
economic impact statement requirement, changes giving the JAPC
greater power, further limitations on the access of prisoners to the
remedies provided under the Act, limitations on judicial review of
rules, and the adoption of a new procedure for adopting federal stan-
dards as state administrative rules. These changes were adopted as
part of a bill that emerged as a last-minute legislative compromise af-
ter it appeared likely that no APA amendments would pass in the
1992 session.
The 1992 amendments must be viewed in context to be fully under-
stood. Some of the forces that shaped the 1992 amendments to the
Act were a direct response to the 1991 amendments. For that reason,
discussion begins with the 1991 amendments. After the 1991 amend-
ments are analyzed, the 1992 amendments will be reviewed.
II. SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE 1992 AMENDMENTS
During the 1991 session, the Florida APA was amended in two im-
portant ways.' 4 First, the Act was amended to require agencies to
adopt their policies as rules where it was feasible and practicable for
them to do so."' Second, the APA was amended to require agencies to
index their orders so those orders would be more accessible to the
12. See Fla. S. Comm. on Approp., Amendment I to SJR 766 (1992) (proposed FLA.
CONST. art. III § 19) (on file with comm.).
13. Fla. SB 824 (1992). This bill sought to require that agency rules be approved or adopted
by the Legislature before they become effective. Id.
14. For further discussion of developments during the 1991 legislative session, see Patricia
A. Dore, Florida Limits Policy Development Through Administrative Adjudication and Re-
quires Indexing and Availability of Agency Orders, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 437 (1991).
15. Ch. 91-30, § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws 241, 244-46 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535).
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public.' 6 These changes were the result of many years of academic crit-
icism and at least two years of legislative study.' 7 The problems the
Legislature tried to address and the solutions it tried to craft to these
problems demonstrate that the 1991 amendments reaffirmed the basic
policy choices made in the Act.
A. The 1991 Amendments
1. The Problems Addressed
The problem the 1991 legislation sought to address was that "Itihe
unchecked use of adjudication to develop policies and the lack of
meaningful access to agency orders"" had created a situation where
"the people who need to know an agency's position on a given issue
cannot find it." 19 By addressing the problem two ways-by requiring
more policy to be adopted as rules as well as requiring better access to
the results of individual adjudication-the legislation sought to force
agency policy out in the open, where it was more likely to be known
and understood when it should be followed or to be debated and re-
vised when it should be changed.
The problem of inadequate access to agency policy has been recog-
nized and addressed before in Florida. The present APA was itself an
innovation intended to "cut down on the private knowledge of the
policies which shape agency decisions which is now possessed only by
small groups of specialists and the agencies' staff." 20 The 1974 APA's
requirement that each agency maintain a subject matter index of its
orders was always explicit. 21 It was an innovation that made sense be-
cause indexing orders by subject matter would make decisions in prior
similar cases available to both the agency and the public, and all in-
volved in agency proceedings would have a better understanding of
what the agency's policy was and how it was being applied.
The Act's rulemaking requirements were similarly designed to make
agency policy clear and accessible to all. The advantages of policy-
making by rule have been recognized-by leading commentators in the
16. Id. § 2, 1991 Fla. Laws at 242-44 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(a)3.).
17. For a survey of the academic criticism and legislative efforts, see Dore, supra note 14,
at 438-39.
18. Id. at 438.
19. Id.
20. REPORTER'S COMMENTS ON PROPOSED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT FOR THE STATE
OF FLORIDA, Mar. 9, 1974, at 6, reprinted in 3 FLA. ADmaN. PRACTICE App. C (1979).
21. FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(c) (Supp. 1974) (provided that each agency shall make available
"a] current subject-matter index, identifying for the public any rule or order issued or adopted
after January 1, 1975.").
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field. 22 Rules are almost always more visible to the public and to
elected officials monitoring the performance of agencies than are the
results of individual adjudications. 23 Rules tend to be published and
readily available at libraries. Individual agency decisions tend to be
harder to find and, when they are found, their impact on future
agency action is more difficult to understand.14 In addition, there is a
broader opportunity for public comment in rulemaking than in indi-
vidual adjudication, and rulemaking is more efficient than making
law by adjudication. 2'
Although the indexing and rulemaking provisions were reasonable
solutions to problems of access to agency information, they ultimately
failed to guarantee access to agency policy because agencies failed to
follow them and the courts failed to enforce agency compliance with
these requirements. The indexing requirement of the 1974 Act, 26 which
was revised in 1979 to permit agencies to use an official reporter,27 was
widely ignored. That is clear from a report by the Senate Committee
on Governmental Operations that found "[w]hile some agencies are
generally in compliance with the requirements of the law, the practices
and procedures of a significant number of agencies fail to carry out
the objectives or agency order requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act." ' 28 That is the opinion of other commentators as
well.
29
The consequences of this noncompliance are significant for regu-
lated persons, the Legislature, and the public at large, all of whom
may not know what policies an agency is following in deciding indi-
vidual cases. What may be worse, the agency itself may not know
what those who act for it are doing. This ignorance may result in the
development of inconsistent agency policies, which results in unfair-
ness, or may require the agency to act without the benefit of its past
experience, which is inefficient and may contribute to making arbi-
trary or incorrect decisions.
22. See generally ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING (1986).
23. Id. at 108.
24. Id. at 106-08.
25. Id.
26. FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(c) (Supp. 1974).
27. Ch. 79-299, § 2, 1979 Fla. Laws 1589, 1591 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(4)).
28. STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON GovnL. Ors., A REvIEw OF INDEXING OF AGENCY ORDERS
ISSUED PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 120, F.S., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 121 (1989) (on file
with comm.).
29. See Dore, supra note 14, at 438; David W. Nam & Barry Kling, Agency Implementation
of Delegated Authority: Towards Compliance with Legislative Intent, FLA. B.J., Feb. 1991, at
64, 65.
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The rulemaking provisions of the 1974 Act were also not faithfully
followed. Section 120.54, which outlines rulemaking procedure, must
be followed when an agency adopts a statement that comes within the
definition of a rule.30 Section 120.52(16) defines the term "rule" as
"each agency statement of general applicability that implements, in-
terprets, or prescribes law or policy."'" This broad definition was de-
signed to define rules by their effect, not by the formalities used to
adopt them. Under this definition, even an unpromulgated agency
statement can be a rule. It was thought that this broad definition of a
rule would subject a wide range of agency policy to the rigors of the
rulemaking process.
Agencies have a long history of resistance to the use of the rulemak-
ing process to adopt their policies as rules because they have tended to
view the rulemaking procedures set forth in section 120.54 as oner-
ous.32 In the earliest days of the Act, substantially affected persons
could respond to noncompliance with the Act's rulemaking provisions
by invalidating unpromulgated agency policy using the section 120.56
rule challenge remedy.33 However, over time, the courts have softened
their position on agency noncompliance with these requirements, and
have decided that the failure to promulgate agency policy as rules may
not necessarily render that policy invalid or unusable.3 4 That has re-
duced the ability of substantially affected persons to protect them-
selves from unpromulgated policy and to force the agency into
rulemaking. 3s
This change in position was apparently the result of concern in the
courts that requiring strict compliance with rulemaking requirements
would spur agency compliance with the Act, but also would punish
the public for an agency's procedural shortcomings. The concern that
automatic invalidation of unpromulgated policy might more often re-
flect clever lawyering than substantial justice seemed quite real. There
30. FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (1974).
31. Id. § 120.52(16) (1991).
32. For my vision of how the rulemaking procedures of the Act should work, and why even
the more expanded rulemaking process that I describe would not be onerous, see Stephen T.
Maher, We're No Angels: Rulemaking and Judicial Review in Florida, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
767 (1991).
33. Dore, supra note 14, at 437. If the policy was invalidated, it "could not be used as a
basis for agency action until it was properly adopted." Id.
34. See, e.g., McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA
1977) (court excepted "incipient agency policy" from the Act's rulemaking requirements).
35. Of course, it has always been possible to require rulemaking, in limited circumstances,
through the filing of a petition to initiate rulemaking pursuant to section 120.54(5), assisted by
judicial review if the agency fails to comply voluntarily. See, e.g., Guerra v. Department of
Labor and Employment Sec., 427 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
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was also a concern that forcing an agency into rulemaking before its
policy was fully developed was unwise. Apparently as a result of these
concerns, the courts softened their position on this issue.
The courts accomplished this shift by recognizing an exception to
the adoption of policy by rule where the policy involved was "incipi-
ent policy." 36 The theory behind this exception was that because such
policy is still incipient, it is not yet of general applicability, and thus
does not fit the definition of a rule in section 120.52(16). 37 As Profes-
sor Patricia Dore noted, "It]he idea was to allow agencies to develop
policies on a case-by-case basis until they had enough knowledge and
experience to formalize the policy into rules." 38 She also stated,
"[i]ncipient, emerging, nonrule policy had to be available for use or
otherwise policy development would be stifled." 39
The courts began to permit agencies that had not adopted their in-
cipient policies as rules to "prove up" those policies as they were ap-
plied at section 120.57 hearings. 40 Although this "prove up"
requirement provided agencies with less incentive to adopt their poli-
cies as rules than the earlier invalidation approach, the courts appar-
ently believed requiring the agency to prove up its policy repeatedly in
section 120.57 proceedings would move the agency toward rulemaking
to relieve itself of this burden. While this assumption seemed reasona-
ble at the time, over the years it has become clear that this incentive
has not been equal to the task. Many agencies have seemed content to
repeatedly prove up their policies rather than to subject those policies
to the rigors of the rulemaking process.4 At the point that legislation
was proposed on this issue, rulemaking had become the exception
rather than the rule.4 2
2. The Solutions Adopted
The legislative history of chapter 91-30 reflects the sentiments be-
hind this new legislation. It evidences a belief that the provisions of
36. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 579.
37. Id. See also Dore, supra note 14, at 437-38; Nam & Kling, supra note 29, at 65.
38. Dore, supra note 14, at 437.
39. Dore, Agenda and Report, supra note 5, at 709.
40. See, e.g., Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am. v. Department of HRS, 559 So. 2d
665, 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) ("an agency may apply incipient or developing policy in a Section
120.57 administrative hearing provided the agency explicates, supports and defends such policy
with competent, substantial evidence on the record in such proceeding.") (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted).
41. See Dore, Agenda and Report, supra note 5, at 709.
42. See id. at 710; see also Dore, supra note 14, at 437-39.
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the APA designed to provide access to agency precedent and to sub-
ject agency policy to scrutiny in the rulemaking process had broken
down. As the House Committee on Governmental Operations found,
"[alt present, many agencies neither subject policies of general appli-
cability to the rulemaking procedure, nor index and make available
orders that contain statements of nonrule policy in the manner re-
quired by law. This restricts legislative oversight and limits public no-
tice and participation in the administrative process. '43
The Legislature responded to this situation in two ways: by
strengthening the indexing requirement and by requiring more agency
rulemaking. It is significant that the remedy adopted in 1991 was
much the same remedy to the problem of inadequate public access to
agency policy that was adopted in 1974. That showed that the Legisla-
ture had not lost confidence in its basic approach. For its basic ap-
proach to work, however, the courts must be less forgiving than they
have in the past with agency noncompliance with legislatively-created
requirements.
a. Indexing Orders
In enacting changes to the requirement that agency orders be in-
dexed, the Legislature recognized, as the earlier Senate Report had,
that "while some agencies comply with the spirit and requirements of
the law with respect to the indexing and availability of orders, the
practices and procedures of a significant number of agencies fail to
carry out the objectives or requirements of the APA. '"' The legisla-
tive history also explains the importance of the provisions on indexing
that were included in that chapter. "A meaningful system of access to
agency orders is necessary because these orders may provide the only
means for identification of statements of an agency's nonrule pol-
icy. 45
The legislative response to the need for better indexes was contained
in several sections of chapter 91-30.4 Section 147 amended section
119.041, Florida Statutes, to provide that agency orders that comprise
final agency action and that must be indexed or listed pursuant to sec-
tion 120.53(2) shall be permanently maintained.
43. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., HB 1879 (1991) Staff Analysis 4 (final May
22, 1991) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter "1991 Final Bill Analysis"l.
44. Id. at 3-4.
45. Id. at 3.
46. For additional discussion of these developments, see Dore, supra note 14, at 450-54.
47. Ch. 91-30, § 1, 1991 Fla. Laws 241, 242 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 119.041(1),(2)).
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Section 248 amended section 120.53(2). Before amendment, that sec-
tion provided that each agency must maintain "a current subject mat-
ter index, identifying for the public any rule or order issued or
adopted after January 1, 1975. ' '49 That broad mandate had been
widely ignored. The new amendment limited the type of orders that
must be maintained and strengthened the indexing requirement. Sec-
tion 2 of chapter 91-30 provided that "unless excluded under para-
graph (c) or paragraph (d)," the following orders must be indexed:
a. Each final agency order resulting from a proceeding under §
120.57(1) or (2);
b. Each final agency order rendered pursuant to § 120.57(3) which
contains a statement of agency policy that may be the basis of future
agency decisions or that may otherwise contain a statement of
precedential value;
c. Each declaratory statement issued by an agency; and
d. Each final order resulting from a proceeding under § 120.54(4)
or § 120.56.10
The statute goes on to require agencies to maintain a list of those final
orders rendered pursuant to section 120.57(3)," which have been ex-
cluded from the indexing requirements of this section with the ap-
proval of the Secretary of State "because they do not contain
statements of agency policy or statements of precedential value."'"
Thus, it is clear that while the indexing requirements of section
120.53(2)(a)3. are less broad than the old, unenforced indexing re-
quirements they replace, the requirements are still intended to cover
most of the final orders entered by agencies in their day-to-day work.
The legislation contains some exceptions to this broad mandate
found in section 120.53(2)(c) and (d).1 Subsection (c) establishes the
areas in which agencies must seek approval in writing from the Secre-
tary of State.14 It provides that each agency must receive such ap-
proval for "the specific types and categories of agency orders that
may be excluded" 5 ' from indexing and publication requirements; the
48. Id. § 2, 1991 Fla. Laws at 242-44 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(a)1.-5.).
49. FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2) (1991).
50. Ch. 91-30, § 2, 1991 Fla. Laws 241, 242 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(a)3.a.-d.).
51. Section 120.57(3) governs "informal disposition" by "stipulation, agreed settlement, or
consent order."
52. Ch. 91-30, § 2, 1991 Fla. Laws 241, 243 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(a)4.). Or-
ders must be indexed or listed within 120 days of rendition. Id., 1991 Fla. Laws at 244 (codified
at FLA. STAY. § 120.53(2)(b)).
53. Id. § 2, 1991 Fla. Laws at 243 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(c)-(d)).
54. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(c)).
55. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(c)1.).
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method of maintaining indexes, lists, and orders;5 6 the method of pub-
lic inspection;"1 the numbering system used;58 and the proposed rules
implementing these requirements. 9 Subsection (d) provides that:
In determining which orders may be excluded from indexing and
public inspection requirements, the Department of State may
consider all factors specified by an agency, including precedential
value, legal significance, and purpose. Only agency orders that are of
limited or no precedential value, that are of limited or no legal
significance, or that are ministerial in nature may be excluded 0
Other amendments to section 120.53 require agencies to specify by
rule the types of orders they were excluding and the locations from
which and the methods by which the required documents could be ob-
tained .61 Agencies also were required to specify by rule all systems in
use by the agency to search and locate agency orders that are required
to be indexed, including automated systems. 62 The "search capabilities
employed by the agency" shall be made available to the public "sub-
ject to reasonable terms and conditions, including a reasonable
charge, as provided in s. 119.07."63 The agency must also specify by
rule how assistance and information pertaining to orders may be ob-
tained .64
The requirements governing the use of a designated official reporter
were also changed. Even where the agency contracts for the publica-
tion of its orders with an official reporter, the new provisions make
the agency retain responsibility for the "quality, timeliness and useful-
ness of the reporter." 6 The amendment also provides that the Depart-
ment of State may publish an official reporter.6
Section 5 of chapter 91-3067 amends section 120.59 to add two para-
graphs-paragraph (1)(b), which provides for a method of incorporat-
ing materials by reference in orders that must be indexed or listed
pursuant to section 120.53, and paragraph (1)(c), which provides for
the sequential numbering of orders that must be indexed or listed.
56. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(c)2.).
57. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(c)3.).
58. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(c)4.).
59. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(c)5.).
60. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(d)).
61. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(e)-(f)).
62. Id.
63. Id., 1991 Fla. Laws at 244 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(g)).
64. Id.
65. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120,53(4)(b)),
66. Id.
67. Id. § 5, 1991 Fla. Laws at 249 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.59).
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Section 7 of chapter 91-3061 provides that the Division of Adminis-
trative Hearings (DOAH) shall direct a study and pilot project to im-
plement a full text retrieval system to provide access to recommended
orders, final orders, and declaratory statements. The study and pilot
project are well under way.
Section 9 of chapter 91-3069 charges the Department of State with
the responsibility to "[administer the coordination of the indexing,
management, preservation, and availability of agency orders that
must be indexed or listed" 70 pursuant to section 120.53(2), Florida
Statutes. The Department must also "[p]rovide, by rule, guidelines
for the indexing of agency orders." 7' It must also provide, by rule, the
storage and retrieval systems that must be maintained for indexing
and making available agency orders. 72 These may include designating
a reporter, a microfilming system, an automated system, or some
other approach. 7
In addition to the responsibility to adopt the above-mentioned
rules, the Department of State has responsibilities in connection with
the adoption of rules by other agencies. It must:
[r]equire each agency, before adopting proposed rules, to report to
the department concerning which types or categories of agency
orders establish precedent for each agency. Each final order that
establishes precedent for an agency and that has not been approved
by the department for exclusion pursuant to paragraphs 120.53(2)(c)
and (d), Florida Statutes, must be indexed. 74
It is also charged with determining "which final orders must be in-
dexed for each agency, including all final orders that are not excluded
from indexing requirements by the Department of State pursuant to
paragraphs 120.53(2)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes." 5
In addition, the Department of State is charged with broad adminis-
trative responsibilities in this area. It is charged with assuring agency
compliance with many of the new requirements, 6 and it must provide
technical and other support for agencies in this area.71 The Depart-
68. Id. § 7, 1991 Fla. Laws at 250.
69. Id. § 9, 1991 Fla. Laws at 251 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.533).
70. Id. § 9(l)(a), 1991 Fla. Laws at 251 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.533(1)(a)).
71. Id. § 9(l)(b), 1991 Fla. Laws at 251 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.533(1)(b)).
72. Id. § 9(1)(c), 1991 Fla. Laws at 251 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.533(1)(c)).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 9(1)(e), 1991 Fla. Laws at 251 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.533(I)(e)).
75. Id. § 9(l)(d), 1991 Fla. Laws at 251 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.533(1)(d)).
76. Id. § 9(1)(f), 1991 Fla. Laws at 251 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.533(1)(e)).
77. Id. § 9(I)(g)-(i), 1991 Fla. Laws at 251-52 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.533(1)(g)-(i)).
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ment is further required to adopt rules "to administer its duties under
this act.""
b. Agency Rulemaking
Chapter 91-30 also contained the legislative response to the need for
more agency rulemaking. That chapter created a new section 120.535,
Florida Statutes,79 which declares that "rulemaking is not a matter of
agency discretion."8 0 Now, all statements that are "rules," as that
term is defined in section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes,"' "shall be
adopted by the rulemaking procedure provided by s. 120.54 as soon as
feasible and practicable." 2 Rulemaking shall be presumed feasible
and practicable unless the agency proves certain defined conditions ex-
ist which, in the Legislature's judgment, justify a departure from this
requirement. This new provision also establishes a new type of admin-
istrative proceeding that may be used to enforce this rulemaking re-
quirement. 3 An agency that loses a section 120.535 proceeding must
not rely on the unpromulgated statement unless it takes specified ac-
tions to adopt the statement as a rule.Y The provision also provides
for the assessment of attorneys' fees against the agency heads of re-
peat offenders.8"
In conjunction with the adoption of section 120.535, the Legislature
amended section 120.57 to add a new subsection 15:
Each agency statement defined as a rule under s. 120.52 and not
adopted by the rulemaking procedure provided by s. 120.54 which is
relied upon by an agency to determine the substantial interests of a
party shall be subject to de novo review by a hearing officer. A
statement shall not enlarge, modify or contravene the specific
provision of law implemented or otherwise exceed delegated
legislative authority. The statement applied as a result of a
proceeding pursuant to this subsection shall be demonstrated to be
within the scope of delegated legislative authority. Recommended
and final orders pursuant to this subsection shall provide an
explanation of the statement that includes the evidentiary basis which
supports the statement applied and a general discussion of the
justification for the statement.8 6
78. Id. § 9(1)(j), 1991 Fla. Laws at 252 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.533(1)(j)).
79. Id. § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws at 244-46 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535).
80. Id., 1991 Fla. Laws at 244 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1)).
81. See supra text accompanying note 31.
82. Ch. 91-30, § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws 241, 244 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1)).
83. Id., 1991 Fla. Laws at 245-46 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(2)-(3), (7)).
84. Id., 1991 Fla. Laws at 246 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(4), (5)).
85. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(6)).
86. Id. § 4, 1991 Fla. Laws at 249 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)15.).
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Finally, chapter 91-30 added section 120.68(3)(b)17 to the Florida
Statutes. That subsection provides there is no automatic stay of the
hearing officer's decision in a section 120.535 proceeding. This section
is designed to assure that an agency seeking to delay the effect of the
hearing officer's decision in a section 120.535 case can demonstrate
grounds for such a delay before one will be granted.
B. A Critique of the 1991 Amendments
1. The New Indexing Provisions
The new indexing requirements are clear at the level of general
themes but become less clear when the text of the amendments is
closely examined. At the level of general themes, the new amendments
are intended to be a leaner and meaner version of the requirements
they replace. The new requirements are leaner because fewer orders
are covered: only final orders must be indexed. They are meaner be-
cause a specific agency response is required. Each agency is expected
to respond by enacting rules, approved by the Department of State,
that explain how to access their final orders and each must index these
orders within 120 days of rendition. At the level of specifics, the stat-
ute is somewhat less clear.
The scheme the amendments establish can be summarized this way.
All final orders in sections 120.57(1), 120.57(2), 120.54(4), and 120.56
proceedings are included within the indexing requirements unless they
are of limited or no precedential value, are of limited or no legal sig-
nificance, or are ministerial in nature. Section 120.57(3) orders must
be indexed if they contain a statement of agency policy that may be
the basis of future agency decisions or that may otherwise contain a
statement of precedential value." If section 120.57(3) orders do not
satisfy this standard, and if the Department of State agrees, section
120.57(3) orders need not be indexed, but they still must be listed. 9
It does not appear that final orders entered in proceedings author-
ized by sections 120.57(1), 120.57(2), 120.57(4), or 120.56 must be
listed if they are excluded, although section 120.57(3) orders excluded
on similar grounds must be listed. It is unclear why this distinction
was made because there appears to be no sound reason to treat the
two categories of excluded orders differently. What impact omitting
categories of orders from the listing requirement will have is also un-
clear as even unlisted orders might be obtained through the public in-
spection requirements of this section. ° However, it is unclear from the
87. Id. § 6, 1991 Fla. Laws at 250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.68(3)(b)).
88. Id. § 2, 1991 Fla, Laws at 243 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(a)3.b.).
89. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(a)4.).
90. FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(a)(2) (1991) (all agency orders shall be made available for public
inspection and copying at no more than cost).
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amendments how long unindexed and unlisted materials will be main-
tained. The amendment to section 119.041 contained in chapter 91-
3091 provides only that indexed and listed orders with continuing legal
significance must be permanently maintained.
The new indexing system has shortcomings in both design and exe-
cution. The system begins with the flawed assumption that only some
agency orders are important. The problem with this assumption is that
which agency orders are "important" and which are "unimportant"
cannot necessarily be determined in the abstract. That determination
is often contextual. If a lawyer is handling a case on an issue that has
never been decided in a section 120.57(1) proceeding, but has often
been addressed in agency orders entered in connection with settle-
ments, then even what people might characterize as the most impor-
tant section 120.57(1) case decided by the agency that year, if decided
on another issue, is of absolutely no importance to that lawyer. Even
if the Settlements are not viewed by the agency as significant, they are
significant to that lawyer. Because all agency orders, even those en-
tered in settlements, are potentially of critical importance, it is error
to confine the indexing requirements to some abstract concept of im-
portant cases. It is especially wrong to treat orders in settlements as
second-class orders.92 In some contexts-such as in professional licens-
ing-those orders may yield vital information concerning how the
agency has treated similarly situated individuals. Thus, the decisions
to "pare down" the indexing requirement, to limit it to final orders,
and to provide second-class treatment to orders entered in connection
with settlements may make enforcement of the requirement more pal-
atable, but important information will be lost as a result of those con-
cessions.
The Department of State has adopted rules to implement the new
indexing requirements. Chapter 1S-691 of the Florida Administrative
Code was adopted by the Department of State, effective January 1,
1992, to establish the minimum requirements that other agencies must
follow in indexing final orders. This was done to implement the 1991
legislation requiring indexing of final orders. Rule 1S-6.004 provides:
91. Ch. 91-30, § 1, 1991 Fla. Laws 241, 242 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 119.041(1), (2)).
92. Id. § 2, 1991 Fla. Laws at 242-43 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(a)3.b.). This sec-
tion provides for indexing in this circumstance only where orders contain a statement of agency
policy that may be the basis of future agency decisions or that may otherwise contain a statement
of precedential value. Id. Although this may sound quite similar to the indexing requirement for
section 120.57(1) final orders, the extent of its difference depends on the selection process used
for determining which are the "important" section 120.57(3) orders and who does the selection.
As the discussion of the Department of State rules that follows demonstrates, see infra text
accompanying notes 93-98, latitude in this area can easily become license.
93. FLA. AN. CODE ANN. r. IS-6.004 (1992).
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The following final orders resulting from a proceeding under section
120.54(4), 120.56, 120.565, and 120.57(1), (2) or (3), Florida
Statutes, must be indexed:
(1) A final order which discusses a substantial legal issue of first
impression which is actually resolved in the case;
(2) A final order which establishes a rule of law, principle, or
policy for the first time which the agency will rely upon and apply in
similar circumstances;
(3) A final order which alters, modifies, or significantly clarifies a
rule of law, principle, or policy previously applied, announced, or
relied upon by the agency;
(4) A final order which resolves an apparent conflict in decisions
of the agency or harmonizes decisions of appellate courts.9
These Department of State rules may be invalid because they appear
to conflict with the legislation they purport to implement. The Depart-
ment's rules require agencies to index only four categories of final or-
ders: (1) a final order that discusses a "substantial legal issue of first
impression which is actually resolved in the case";95 (2) a final order
that "establishes a rule of law, principle, or policy for the first time,
which the agency will rely upon and apply in similar circumstances"; 96
(3) a final order that "alters, modifies or significantly clarifies a rule
of law, principle or policy previously applied, announced or relied
upon";97 or (4) a final order that resolves an apparent conflict "in
agency decisions or that harmonizes decisions of appellate courts.'"'9
This rule takes an extremely narrow view of what must be indexed
(only "important" orders) and takes a very narrow view of what kind
of orders are "important" (only orders that break new ground).
This is clearly a different indexing standard than the one adopted
by the Legislature." The Legislature mandated the indexing of "each
final agency order" in all section 120.57 proceedings. There are two
exceptions to this rule. The first is that where section 120.57(3) pro-
ceedings are involved, only orders which contain "a statement of
agency policy that may be the basis of future agency decisions or that
may otherwise contain a statement of precedential value" 1°° must be
indexed. The second exception is that the Department of State may
94. Id. r. IS-6.004(1)-(4).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
100. Ch. 91-30, § 2, 1991 Fla. Laws 241, 242 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(a)3.b.).
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grant exclusions from the Act's broad indexing requirements pursuant
to section 120.53(2)(d).10 1
The Legislature recognized that, in some circumstances, it would be
appropriate to grant exclusions from the Act's broad indexing man-
date, but it drew the parameters for those exceptions narrowly. The
Legislature mandated that "[o]nly agency orders that are of limited or
no precedential value, that are of limited or no legal significance, or
that are ministerial in nature may be excluded."' 0 2 This "slim to
none" exclusion standard in the statute has been transformed by the
Department of State into an "only the most significant" inclusion
standard. The Department's decision to require indexing only espe-
cially significant orders is hard to reconcile with either the language of
the statute or the clear legislative intent. If it is followed, this rule may
exclude the bulk of final agency orders from the indexing require-
ment. This cannot be what the Legislature intended. For these rea-
sons, it appears that the rule conflicts with the statute and is,
therefore, invalid. The argument can be made that the language in
section 120.53(2)(d) that provides for the exception of agency orders
of "limited or no precedential value" gave the Department of State
the authority to judge what is meant by "limited" precedential value,
and that all orders that do not break new ground have "limited"
value. The problem with this approach is that it fails to give adequate
consideration to the intent of the statute.
The statute intended to make agency decisions available to the Leg-
islature to conduct oversight activities and to substantially affected
persons so they can better prepare and argue their cases to agencies.
The limitation of indexing to major precedents decreases the amount
of information indexing can provide about agency policy. It is one
thing to know a precedent has been established. It is another to know
whether it is being followed. What makes a precedent major: whether
it is delivered with fanfare, or whether it is followed faithfully in a
given factual situation? Will the index required by the Department of
State allow substantially affected persons to determine whether a ma-
jor precedent is published with fanfare but conveniently ignored in
similar factual circumstances? It does not appear that it will. By al-
lowing an agency to determine the precedents it wants people to think
are significant and to keep the rest of its decisions inaccessible, the
rule permits an agency to create a fictional version of its policy. That
version may play well to the public or the legislators that it is designed
to impress, but it may not stand up to the careful scrutiny that a bet-
101. Id., 1991 Fla. Laws at 243 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(d)).
102. Id.
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ter index would permit concerning how those allegedly significant pre-
cedents have been applied, case by case. If all the new indexing
requirement accomplishes is to allow the agency to showcase prece-
dents it is proud of, then it will not really produce the kind of public
information about agency policy-the raw material for legislative
oversight-that the statutory changes were intended to produce. The
Legislature should never have included the phrase "limited or" in the
exception section. That language is not consistent with other sections
of the statute, which clearly evidence an intent to require the indexing
of the great bulk of agency final orders, and it has provided the ex-
cuse for creating a rule that, if followed by other agencies, promises
to weaken the already weakened indexing requirements of the Act.
The Department of State rule is particularly surprising because it
does not appear that the Legislature even intended the Department to
restate the legislative standard. The statute seems to charge the De-
partment with devising a system for implementing the legislative ex-
clusion standard articulated in the statute-a task that the Department
still has apparently not undertaken, at least not through the rule adop-
tion process. The Department should be ensuring that agencies com-
ply with the statute's requirements, determining where exclusions are
appropriate within the narrow limits set by the statute, and assisting
agencies with technical and other support so they may more easily
comply with the legislative mandate.0 3 The legislation clearly contem-
plates an exception-drawing process that is individual to each agency.
The rules needed here are procedural, not substantive. They should
prescribe the procedure to be followed when the Department of State
determines (1) which types or categories of agency orders establish
precedent for each agency, (2) which agency orders will be approved
for exclusion pursuant to section 120.53(2)(c) and (d), and (3) which
agency orders entered pursuant to section 120.57(3) will be ex-
cluded. 1° 4 Rules could specify the types of materials that must be sub-
mitted with the request for an exception to help the Department
determine the "types or categories of agency orders"' 0 that establish
precedent and could specify other information that should be submit-
ted to make the Department's exception drawing process more accu-
rate and efficient. A more established process could provide a forum
for the discussion of which orders should be excluded from the index-
ing requirements, and which should not. There presently is no clear
103. Id. § 9(1)0), 1991 Fla. Laws at 252 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.533(1)6)) (providing
that the Department of State shall adopt rules to administer its duties under this Act).
104. Id. § 9(l)(d), 1991 Fla. Laws at 251 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.533(1)(d)).
105. Id. § 9(l)(e), 1991 Fla. Laws at 251 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.533(1)(e)).
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point of entry into this decision-making process. It is not clear
whether or how the Department of State is viewing each agency's indi-
vidual circumstances in granting exemptions pursuant to this provi-
sion.
The Department of State's approach to indexing could seriously de-
grade the value of the agency indexes now being developed. If agen-
cies follow the Department's narrow approach to indexing, the
indexes that are being developed will contain only orders the agency
thinks are important and may not reflect settled law. Subject matter
indexes of this quality will prove to be a waste of resources because
they will not significantly improve access to agency information.
Assuming the Department of State rules are valid, they present sig-
nificant interpretive problems. Does the new indexing statute, along
with the Department of State rules adopted to implement it, require
agencies that have not indexed their rules to index their final orders
back to 1975 when the indexing requirement was first enacted? Or is
the new requirement prospective only, requiring agencies that have
thus far failed to comply with the indexing requirement to do so be-
ginning with final orders rendered after the effective date of the new
statute and Department rules?
If only prospective indexing is required, then two points arise. First,
if the amendment's requirements are prospective, what is the nature
of the compromise? Does the amendment repeal the old, broader in-
dexing requirements or does it leave those old requirements un-
changed? If the old requirements remain unchanged, agencies must
still index all of their orders before the effective date of the amend-
ment. If the amendment has the effect of repealing old indexing re-
quirements, then agencies that have failed to comply with that
requirement since 1975 have been pardoned and will never have to
make those seventeen years of agency precedent accessible to the pub-
lic. That pardon is a significant concession because it may remove the
agency's failure to comply with the old indexing requirement as a
ground for remand of agency action on judicial review.
The failure of an agency to comply with the indexing requirements
of section 120.53 has long had the potential for creating error in sec-
tion 120.57 proceedings. Error can occur in the following way. While
a petition for a hearing pursuant to section 120.57 is pending, a sub-
stantially affected person can request a subject matter index of agency
orders to assist in the preparation for the upcoming hearing. This can
either be done through discovery in connection with the section 120.57
hearing or the section 120.57 petition can be joined with a petition
pursuant to section 120.54(5) requesting the agency "to provide the
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minimum public information required by s. 120.53."'16 If the agency
has not compiled a subject matter index, and does not provide one as
requested, that failure interferes with the substantially affected per-
son's ability to prepare for the section 120.57 hearing. While this
could be prejudicial in almost any case, it is especially prejudicial in
cases where the agency policy involved in the hearing is policy that has
not been adopted by rule. That increases the prejudice because the
agency's rationale for its policy, the uniformity with which it has ap-
plied its nonrule policy, and the exceptions that it has recognized to its
nonrule policy may all remain unclear unless prior agency precedents
detailing these points can be located and analyzed.
An affected person need not demonstrate that the failure to main-
tain the subject matter index required by section 120.53 is a material
error in procedure. "Failure of an agency to comply with s. 120.53
shall be presumed to be a material error in procedure, ' ' 0° and a re-
viewing court "shall remand the case for further agency action if it
finds that either the fairness of the proceeding or the correctness of
the action may have been impaired by a material error in proce-
dure. "1'0 How the new indexing requirements affect a substantially af-
fected person's ability to use these provisions to obtain access to
agency precedents remains unclear. If the amendments are found to
leave old indexing requirements intact before the effective date of the
amendments, then old agency failures may still be raised in this man-
ner. HoWever, if the new provisions are interpreted to excuse agency
noncompliance with the old indexing requirement they may not. In
that case, the amendment is a major concession to recalcitrant agen-
cies as it insulates them from judicial review for their persistent failure
to comply with the Act.
Second, if the Department's rules contemplate a prospective index-
ing requirement, they do not make clear how agencies are to handle
the practical problems that such a requirement would create. Inevita-
bly, agencies will be confronted with the following question: How
should we handle the indexing of a final order that does not break
new ground in the context of prior, unindexed agency decisions, but is
new in the sense that the agency's subject matter index of orders pres-
ently does not reflect such a precedent? The Department of State rule
seems to exclude such decisions from indexing. If that position is fol-
lowed and the new case is not included, the law in the area will remain
settled but inaccessible. The Department's rule could be read to re-
quire that an order that does not create new law must be indexed in
106. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(5) (1991).
107. Id. § 120.68(8).
108. Id.
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circumstances where no similar order has yet been indexed. Even if
that construction is adopted, the rule is still problematic because that
additional requirement is unstated. If that is the rule's intent, it
should be amended to make clear that until the agency's subject mat-
ter index accurately reflects existing law, even cases that do not meet
the Department of State rule's requirements concerning legal signifi-
cance must be indexed. If no such additional requirement is found to
exist, then the index mandated by the Department's rule will fail to
include all the more settled precedent that is currently not indexed,
and the indexing requirements may never create an accurate picture of
the state of agency orders. That will render the index inherently unre-
liable and, hence, useless. The irony here is that if new cases must be
indexed, not because they are important but because they are new,
then indexing may make some of these new cases major cases because
they are the first precedents on the point to be widely accessible, not
because they are that significant in terms of changes in agency policy.
If the statutory indexing requirement is retroactive, requiring agen-
cies to go back to 1975 and index all final orders, or some more lim-
ited categories of final orders as the Department of State rule
requires, then the problems outlined above do not arise. However, it
is fair to assume, based on the history of this matter, that agencies
will resist reading this requirement as retroactive. This issue may ulti-
mately have to be resolved by the courts.
What impact has the Department of State rule had on agencies thus
far? A review of recent issues of the Florida Administrative Code re-
veals the following: Many agencies have ignored the license provided
by the Department of State and have elected to propose rules that pro-
vide for the indexing of all agency orders, without exception. 1°9
While some agencies have decided to seek all the leeway the Depart-
ment of State rules provide,"10 others have taken an approach that fol-
109. Ten agencies have proposed rules that require all agency final orders issued pursuant to
§§ 120.565 and 120.57(l)-(3) to be indexed. See Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly
4221 (July 24, 1992); Dep't of State, Florida Elections Comm'n, 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 3624
(June 26, 1992); Dep't of State, except its Div. of Licensing and the Florida Elections Comm'n,
18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 3333 (June 12, 1992); Dep't of Legal Aff., 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 2951
(May 22, 1992); Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 2341 (Apr. 17,
1992); Dep't of Correct., 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 2157 (Apr. 10, 1992); Dep't of Nat. Resources,
18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 2015 (Apr. 3, 1992); Fla. Land & Water Adjudicatory Comm'n, 18 Fla.
Admin. Weekly 1667 (Mar. 13, 1992); Loxahatchee River Envtl. Control Dist., 18 Fla. Admin.
Weekly 1664 (Mar. 13, 1992); Dep't of Ins., 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 1418 (Mar. 6, 1992).
110. Four agencies have proposed rules that essentially adopt the Department of State's ap-
proach to indexing orders. See Dep't of Envtl. Reg., 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 3508 (June 19,
1992); Dep't of Comm'y Aff., 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 1889 (Mar. 27, 1992); State Bd. of Ad-
min., 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 1325 (Feb. 28, 1992); Dep't of Bus. Reg., 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly
1125 (Feb. 21, 1992).
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lows the Department of State rules in a somewhat modified fashion.'
One agency has created its own standard, paraphrasing the statute
rather than the Department of State rule.11 2 A few agencies have de-
cided, apparently with the Department of State's approval, to adopt
rules that attempt to exclude from indexing even orders that the De-
partment of State rule requires to be indexed."' One agency, deciding
to go beyond subject matter indexes, has established an electronic da-
tabase of final orders and will use a search and retrieval system to
make those orders accessible to the public." 4
Perhaps the Legislature has given the Department of State too
much responsibility for fine-tuning and executing its revitalized index-
ing requirement. Should the Legislature have placed so much respon-
sibility there? On the positive side, the choice of the Department of
State for this role has historical support. The Secretary of State was
first assigned the role of establishing the uniform indexing procedures
that agencies must follow in complying with the Act's indexing re-
quirement in the Committee Substitute for House Bill 2672, the legis-
lation that became the 1974 Administrative Procedure Act."5 Also,
placing these responsibilities in the Department of State potentially
provides a good fit with electronic data storage and retrieval projects
that are ongoing within the Department. The Department has also had
a long association with the publishing of other public information re-
quired by the Act, especially in the rulemaking area.
Despite these qualifications, there is reason to doubt that the De-
partment is the right entity to head the newly revitalized indexing ef-
fort. First, the Department has shown little enthusiasm for this job. It
has only promulgated one set of rules in this area, ' 6 and those rules
111. See Dep't of Educ., 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 3632 (June 26, 1992); Dep't of State, Div.
of Licensing, 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 3051 (May 29, 1992); Dep't of HRS, 18 Fla. Admin.
Weekly 2952 (May 22, 1992).
112. Dep't of Gen. Servs., 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 3244 (June 5, 1992).
113. Dep't of Rev., 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 5106 (Sept. 4, 1992) (asserting that final orders
resulting from stipulations, agreed settlements and consent agreements are excluded from index-
ing); Dep't of Law Enforce., 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 2955 (May 22, 1992) (asserting final orders
resulting from stipulations, agreed settlements and consent agreements will not be indexed);
Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 2128 (Apr. 10, 1992) (asserting that
final orders in section 120.57(2)-(3) are not required to be indexed).
114. Dep't of Bank. & Fin., 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 4097 (July 17, 1992). This alternative
approach to indexing was approved in the 1992 amendments. See infra notes 221-24 and accom-
panying text.
115. The Secretary of State was not given this role in either the Law Revision Council's
draft, FLA. ApsnN. PRAcnicE App. B (Supp. 1992), or the original version of House Bill 2672.
116. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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are problematic at best. Other rules that appear necessary to its role
have not been adopted. Second, the Department, as an agency, may
have too much sympathy for the logistical problems that agencies face
in the implementation of this requirement and not enough sympathy
for the access problems faced by those who seek to discover and use
this information.
In its legislative oversight role, the Legislature is a user of the
agency information that these indexes are designed to generate. Per-
haps for this reason, the Legislature has shown considerably less def-
erence to agency resistance to these requirements than has the
Department of State.1 17 Thus, perhaps the Department's lack of en-
thusiasm and its agency perspective make it unsuited to the role the
Legislature has given it in this area.
There are two alternatives to the regulatory scheme the statute has
prescribed. First, the responsibility to implement the indexing require-
ments may be given to another entity, or second, the indexing require-
ments may be made less flexible so there is less discretion in their
implementation and thus less administration to implement them.
Making the requirement more inflexible is the only answer unless
some more responsible overseer of this effort can be found.
What entity can be trusted with the responsibility to implement the
new indexing requirement? The Joint Administrative Procedures
Committee (JAPC) is one possibility. On the positive side, the JAPC
has a community of interest with the Legislature concerning the need
for this information for legislative oversight. It has also done a good,
low-key job in the area of rulemaking" 8 and has shown itself capable
of working informally with agencies to move them in the right direc-
tion. This informal working relationship could be expanded into the
indexing area. On the downside, the JAPC's responsibilities to date
have been mainly in the area of rulemaking, and it would take a shift
in emphasis and the addition of staff to handle new responsibilities.
However, adding responsibilities in this area might be consistent with
the 1992 amendments, which place more power in the JAPC's
hands." 9 Another more serious problem with placing responsibility
for implementing the indexing requirements in the JAPC is that the
117. See discussion supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
118. The JAPC staff routinely reviews agency rules for technical and substantive errors.
Most errors are corrected by informal staff contacts, but where agencies have refused, formal
objections are voted on by the JAPC and the matter is resolved by modification of either the
agency rule or the statute with which it conflicts. In 1991, the JAPC reviewed 4310 rules and its
staff found 1193 technical errors and 755 substantive errors. The committee voted 16 formal
objections, which were resolved by 14 rule amendments and two statutory changes.
119. For a discussion of these developments, see infra notes 250-71 and accompanying text.
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JAPC is a legislative committee and has no rulemaking authority.
That would present an obstacle if any rulemaking would need to be
done as part of the implementation of those requirements, but could
be solved by making the details clear by statute.
Another possible approach to implementing the indexing require-
ments is placement of these responsibilities in the Administration
Commission. The Commission, one of the hats worn by the Governor
and Cabinet, has rulemaking authority and could be given more. The
Commission is more likely to provide executive oversight of this proc-
ess more truly representative of the interests of the executive branch
than is the Department of State, because the Commission includes
representatives from more agencies within the executive branch. How-
ever, better executive oversight may not be what is needed here. As
regulation by the Department of State in this area has already demon-
strated, the executive branch bears the burden of the indexing require-
ments and flexibility may easily become license when exercised by
those who bear the burden of the requirements being implemented.
Thus, it is difficult to find an ideal entity to administer the indexing
requirements, and it may be necessary to permit less flexibility in the
implementation of the new indexing requirements if they are to be-
come a real benefit to those seeking access to agency precedent.
2. Section 120.535
Section 120.535 is an attempt to strike a legislatively-defined bal-
ance between the requirement of rulemaking and the need for excep-
tions. The Legislature did this explicitly because it was dissatisfied,
with the balance struck by the courts in the past. This is clear from the
legislative history: "This bill is intended to limit the discretion cur-
rently exercised by administrative agencies when selecting the means
for implementation of delegated legislative authority. The bill pro-
vides a statutory standard for determining when an agency is required
to implement delegated authority by rulemaking.' 'I Court decisions
that give a restrictive interpretation to the term "general applicabil-
ity" as used in the definition of the term "rule" are specifically disap-
proved. 12'
The new approach adopted in the amended section 120.535 focuses
on agency "statements."' 2  The concept of an agency statement is
drawn from the definition of a rule contained in section 120.52(16),
120. 1991 Final Bill Analysis, supra note 43, at 4.
121. Id. For further discussion of this case law see supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
122. Ch. 91-30, § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws 241, 244 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535).
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Florida Statutes. 23 The legislative history to this provision makes clear
that, for the purposes of section 120.535, an agency statement "is in-
tended to encompass any form of communication by an agency.'2
Section 120.535 provides a remedy that permits substantially affected
persons to attack agency statements that have not been adopted as
rules in a new proceeding that can have the effect of forcing agencies
to adopt those statements, or similar statements, as rules.
Section 120.535 neither provides for the invalidation of agency
statements not promulgated as rules, as some of the early cases did,
nor permits agencies to forever avoid adopting their policies as rules.
The balance struck by the Legislature in this area is a compromise,
one that attempts to avoid a return to an emphasis on form over sub-
stance that was characteristic of pre-McDonald'25 law while providing
real rulemaking requirements, not just the incentive to move agencies
toward rulemaking that was thought to be provided by the "prove-
up" standard imposed by the courts. The flurry of recent rulemaking
activity by some agencies that have not traditionally used the rulemak-
ing process as much as they might have suggests that section 120.535
is actually encouraging rulemaking. However, despite the care and
study that went into the creation of section 120.535, some ambiguities
exist within this provision that will need some administrative and judi-
cal construction.
Section 120.535 makes it clear that agencies are required to adopt
their policies as rules when it is feasible and practicable to do so, and
further provides that rulemaking shall be presumed to be feasible and
practicable. 26 Agencies, then, have the burden of demonstrating ei-
ther that rulemaking is not feasible or is impracticable. 12" The Legisla-
ture provided five specific defenses to rulemaking within these
categories, three to feasibility and two to practicability.,, It is likely
that the particulars of these defenses will be litigated.
The first defense to feasibility is that "[tihe agency has not had suf-
ficient time to acquire the knowledge and experience reasonably neces-
sary to address a statement by rulemaking.' '129 What is the nature of
the dispute that is likely to emerge here? The plain language of this
123. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
124. 1991 Final Bill Analysis, supra note 43, at 4.
125. McDonald v. Department of Banking and Fin., 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
See supra note 34 and accompanying text for a discussion of McDonald and its effect on agency
rulemaking.
126. FLA. STAT. § 120.535 (1991).
127. Id. § 120.535(l)(a)-(b).
128. Id.
129. Id. § 120.535(1)(a)1.
1992]
392 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:367
provision does not seem to provide the agency with a defense simply
because it does not have the knowledge or experience necessary to
make rules. The language of the statute, specifically the use of the
word "time," suggests that the proper inquiry is whether the agency
had the time reasonably necessary to gain knowledge and experience,
not whether the agency used that time to educate itself. The use of the
phrase "reasonably necessary" suggests that an objective rather than
a subjective standard is intended concerning what amount of time is
necessary. This suggests that DOAH and the courts should not neces-
sarily defer to an agency's judgment in this regard.
The legislative history demonstrates that, while the statute talks in
terms of time, an agency's actual experience with the policy was also a
focus of legislative concern:
An important consideration regarding the time an agency needs to
address a statement by rulemaking is prior reliance by the agency on
the statement or a substantially similar statement. This factor is not
applicable if an agency has gained sufficient knowledge and
experience from prior reliance on a statement to permit rulemaking.
The frequency with which an agency has relied on a statement or a
substantially similar statement is another important consideration.
This factor is not applicable if an agency has relied upon a statement
with a degree of frequency that indicates rulemaking is reasonably
possible. 30
Thus, it appears that the expression of the requirement in terms of
time rather than actual experience may have been designed to expand
the requirement beyond the agency's actual experience. However, it
also might- be possible to give this provision a narrower reading and,
consistent with the plain language, inquire only into whether the
agency had the time to get the necessary experience in connection with
this defense. If the latter approach is adopted, then the question of
the agency's actual experience could be reserved for the inquiry made
in connection with the first practicability defense.'
The plain language of this provision could create a problem to the
extent it is read to suggest that an agency can be forced into rulemak-
ing where it does not in fact have the knowledge or experience to
make rules, but where it had the time to gain such knowledge and
experience but failed to do so.' A reluctance to make a lack of
130. 1991 Final Bill Analysis, supra note 43, at 5.
131. See discussion of this point infra text accompanying note 138.
132. Courts that Find the statute clear and unambiguous refuse to look beyond the Legisla-
tive history. See Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So. 2s
879, 882 (Fla. 1983).
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knowledge and experience a defense in all circumstances is under-
standable. Agencies could avoid rulemaking by staying uninformed,
and it would not be desirable to encourage ignorance. On the other
hand, the idea of punishing an agency by forcing it into rulemaking,
unfettered by knowledge and experience, also seems quite undesirable.
The idea of rulemaking as punishment is a concern because rules
made by an uninformed agency can do real damage to substantially
affected persons. While the idea has something of a parallel in emer-
gency rulemaking,"' it does not sound like a good idea here.
The second defense to non-feasibility is that "[r]elated matters are
not sufficiently resolved to enable the agency to address a statement
by rulemaking."' 3 4 The legislative history here states: "This factor al-
lows consideration of related matters that must be resolved as a condi-
tion precedent to rulemaking. This factor is applicable if related
matters are not sufficiently resolved to permit rulemaking. An agency
must proceed to rulemaking as soon as related matters are sufficiently
settled to permit rulemaking.""la This provision seems designed to al-
low the agency to take care of conditions precedent and not to excuse
an agency's noncompliance on the basis that it is too busy with other
important, if somewhat tangential, matters. Too broad a construction
of this exception could defeat the section.
If either of the first two defenses to a section 120.535 proceeding
are resolved in an agency's favor, that does not end the matter perma-
nently. An agency that has not yet had the time reasonably necessary
to gain the knowledge and experience to make rules, at one point in
time, may soon find itself in a different position. Related matters may
soon be resolved. Therefore, the first two defenses are temporary, and
this raises the issue of how litigants who seek to move an agency to-
ward rulemaking should respond to these time-limited defenses. One
way is for them to file successive section 120.535 proceedings. Given
the time-limited nature of these defenses, such filings should not be
barred. Another approach would be to seek relief in the section
120.535 proceeding different from the relief available in a final order.
Thus, if an agency raises a time-limited defense, perhaps litigants
could respond either by asking the DOAH hearing officer to either
abate the action or to set deadlines for beginning rulemaking that
would allow the agency time to surmount its time-limited obstacles to
133. Where emergency rulemaking is not permitted to relieve an agency from self-created
emergencies, even if the requirement that an agency rely on regular rulemaking in such circum-
stances, this will result in serious consequences for the agency and the public.
134. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1)(a)2. (1991).
135. 1991 Final Bill Analysis, supra note 43, at 5.
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rulemaking. This would provide relief without the need for successive
filings. If DOAH presently does not have the power to grant requests
of this kind, an amendment to confer such power should be consid-
ered.
The third defense to the presumption that rulemaking is feasible is
that "[t]he agency is currently using the rulemaking procedure expedi-
tiously and in good faith to adopt rules which address the state-
ment." 13 6 On its face, this provision seems to contradict itself. If the
agency is using rulemaking to adopt the statement, is it not safe to
assume just the opposite of what the statute suggests, that rulemaking
is in fact quite feasible? This defense appears to be primarily a "moot
out" provision, rather than a defense. It allows the agency that has
seen the error of its ways to stop the proceedings and begin rulemak-
ing before a final order is entered.
This provision provides a valuable opportunity to an agency that
believes it will ultimately lose the section 120.535 proceeding. Section
120.535(I)(a)3. may permit agencies to terminate section 120.535 pro-
ceedings on summary judgment, thus saving the time and other re-
sources that would need to be expended if the matter went to trial. A
similar option is available to an agency even after it loses the section
120.535 proceeding after trial. Section 120.535(5) permits the agency
to avoid the effect of a loss of a section 120.535 proceeding by begin-
ning the formal adoption of the statement at issue in the section
120.535 proceeding.
Section 120.535(1)(a)3. may have advantages that section 120.535(5)
does not. It is likely that agencies will contend that the language of
section 120.535(1)(a)3. permits agencies to terminate section 120.535
proceedings on summary judgment based upon rulemaking activity
short of actually beginning rulemaking. Agencies may argue that un-
der section 120.535(l)(a)3., which is available to agencies "using rule-
making procedure," even a notice of a rule-development workshop
may suffice to satisfy this section and provide a moot out defense.
Agencies will likely argue that actual publication of proposed rules is
not required. Section 120.535(5) mandates publication of proposed
rules pursuant to section 120.54(1) in order to satisfy its requirements.
The dissimilarity of the language of the two provisions supports this
argument. Thus, this question is likely to be litigated.
The other questions likely to arise here are how late in the section
120.535 proceedings this defense can be raised and what procedure
should be followed in raising it. Because it is more like a moot-out
136. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1)(a)3. (1991).
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provision than an actual defense, can the agency wait until after the
hearing in the section 120.535 proceeding goes badly, but before the
order is entered, and then file a copy of a notice of workshop with the
hearing officer together with a suggestion of mootness? Or must this
be raised as a defense before or during the hearing and be supported
by evidence? Petitioners may argue that because this is a defense, it
must be raised as a defense would be. While under the Model Rules
and the DOAH rules, an answer is not required, 37 a petitioner may
move for an order requiring an answer. Petitioners might be well-ad-
vised to seek such an order in section 120.535 cases because the statute
creates so many potential affirmative defenses. If an answer is filed
and this defense is not raised, is it waived, thus prohibiting the agency
from mooting out the proceedings in this way? These issues will be
litigated as well. Given the fact that the purposes of these proceedings
are to get rulemaking started, it is unlikely that courts will take too
rigid a procedural approach in most cases. However, there may be
cases where the entire litigation may focus on this defense. For exam-
ple, section 120.535 will sometimes be used to test the agency's com-
mitment to rulemaking that it proposed and then apparently
abandoned. In that circumstance, the issues in the case would proba-
bly focus on the agency's good faith and commitment to its stated
intention. Here again, the question of whether hearing officers can set
time limits and otherwise get more involved in the rulemaking process
might arise.
The next set of defenses is to the idea that rulemaking is practica-
ble. It is possible that the defenses available under these sections
might be more permanent defenses to rulemaking than those available
under feasibility because rulemaking that is not feasible at one point
might become so later, where if rulemaking is not practicable, it might
remain so over time. Whether this will prove true depends on how the
practicability defenses are interpreted.
The first of the two defenses available under this section provides
that rulemaking is not required where the agency proves that "[d]etail
or precision in the establishment of principles, criteria, or standards
for agency decisions is not reasonable under the circumstances."' 38
Does "under the circumstances" mean detail is not reasonable be-
cause of the nature of the decisions themselves (e.g., they are very fact
specific), or does it tie back into the same kinds of concerns raised in
the feasibility section-that not enough expertise has yet been gained
137. A respondent or intervenor may file an answer and, if it chooses to do so, the answer
shall be filed within 20 days. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. rr. 28-5.203 and 60Q-2.004(5).
138. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(l)(b)l. (1991).
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to enable the agency to provide detail in the rule? If the former is
intended, then this defense will remain viable over time because, in the
example, the decisions are likely to continue to remain fact specific. If
the latter is intended, the defense will not remain viable over time be-
cause, as the agency gains expertise, its ability to add detail will in-
crease.
While it might appear that the former reading is preferable, there
may be a practical reason to support the latter construction to main-
tain a clearer division between feasibility and practicability. As was
noted earlier,'39 section 120.535(1)(a)1. may be construed to turn on
the question of whether the agency has had time to gain the needed
expertise, not whether it has actually done so. If this construction is
adopted, the danger is that it may be feasible to require rulemaking
when the agency does not yet have the competence to do a credible
job making rules in the area. The first defense on practicability might
provide a response to this dilemma. It could provide a justification for
waiting for the agency to gain expertise it should have gained earlier,
and rulemaking might not be compelled in such circumstances on the
ground of impracticability.
The second defense to practicability is that "[tihe particular ques-
tions addressed are of such a narrow scope that more specific resolu-
tion of the matter is impractical outside of an adjudication to
determine the substantial interests of a party based on individual cir-
cumstances. '"'4 This section creates defenses to rulemaking in situa-
tions where a good case can be made that the agency is in an area
where rules would be difficult to draw and would not be particularly
helpful even if they were drawn. Thus, section 120.535(1), in most
cases, will remove agency discretion from the decision whether or not
to adopt agency policy as rules.
How are these substantive provisions implemented? Section 120.535
establishes its own procedure for enforcing its rulemaking require-
ments. Sections 120.535(2), (3), and (7) prescribe a procedure for en-
forcing subsection (1) that is similar to the scheme the APA
establishes to litigate rule challenges.' 4' A petition is filed with the
DOAH, where it is assigned to a hearing officer within ten days,
heard within thirty days of assignment, and decided within thirty days
of the hearing. 42 As with rule challenges, the DOAH hearing officer
has final order authority. 143
139. See supra text accompanying notes 129-33.
140. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1)(b)2. (1991).
141. Compare id. §§ 120.54(4) (proposed rule challenges) and 120.56 (existing rule chal-
lenges) with id. § 120.535(2), (3), (7).
142. Id. § 120.535(2), (3).
143. Id.
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As practitioners are just beginning their experience with these sub-
sections, there are some points that bear emphasis. The first relates to
the publication of notice of the section 120.535 proceeding. The stat-
ute provides that a copy of the petition and the final order should be
sent to the Secretary of State and the JAPC, and that notice should be
published in the Florida Administrative Weekly (FAW). When the pe-
tition is filed, the FAW currently publishes just the paragraphs of the
petition that describe the nature of the challenged statement. These
are taken out of the context of the petition and-out of that context-
they may be hard to understand or may even be misleading. A peti-
tioner filing a section 120.535 petition should anticipate that a portion
of the petition will be excerpted in this fashion and should attempt to
draft a section of the petition that explains the challenged statement in
a manner that is clear and self-contained. The Model Rules should be
amended to describe requirements for section 120.535 petitions.'"
Some pitfalls exist in the procedure prescribed by the statute, and
these should be made clear so they do not become traps for the un-
wary practitioner. Section 120.535 outlines five affirmative defenses
to the requirement of rulemaking. 4 How will someone filing a section
120.535 proceeding find out which affirmative defense the agency is
relying on? As has previously been noted, neither the Model Rules nor
the DOAH rules require the agency to file an answer in proceedings
before DOAH. 146 Thus, unless petitioners file with their petitions a
motion to compel an answer and/or seek to discover agency defenses
through interrogatories with their petitions, the petitioners are un-
likely to find out which affirmative defenses the agency is planning to
rely on before the hearing. Even requests for admission that track the
petition might be of little help because, in the case of affirmative de-
fenses, the agency is likely to be trying to avoid rather than to deny
the petition's allegations. It might make sense to amend the Model
Rules to require agencies to file an answer when they will seek to rely
on affirmative defenses in the proceeding.
144. It is time to completely overhaul the Model Rules. This call to overhaul the Model Rules
is based upon several points. First, it has been about 12 years since the last comprehensive over-
haul. Second, the realities of agency practice have deviated far from the ideal of a set of model
rules of agency procedure. Third, the Model Rules never were as good as they could be, or
comprehensive enough to cover all aspects of agency practice. That is clear from the fact that
DOAH adopted a separate set of rules that must be read together with the Model Rules when
one practices before DOAH. This situation should be eliminated. There would be no need for
special agency rules in most cases if the Model Rules were a better set of rules. We have enough
experience under the APA to write a superior set of model rules, and we should do so.
145. FLA. STAT. § 120.535 (1991).
146. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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Sections 120.535(4) and (5) describe what petitioners gain when they
win a section 120.535 proceeding. 47 If the DOAH hearing officer
finds that all or part of a statement violates section 120.535(1), then
"the agency shall immediately discontinue all reliance upon the state-
ment or any substantially similar statement as a basis for agency ac-
tion." 4 However, if an agency publishes a proposed rule pursuant to
section 120.54(1), which addresses the statement, and if the agency
proceeds expeditiously and in good faith to adopt rules, then the
agency may rely upon the statement or a substantially similar state-
ment as a basis for agency action. 49 Failure to adopt rules within 180
days, unless the delay is caused by an intervening section 120.54(4)
challenge, is presumed not to be expeditious or in good faith. 150
Section 120.535(6) provides for the award of attorneys' fees and
reasonable costs in certain situations.' If an agency statement has
been found to violate subsection (1), and if an agency continues to
rely on it or on a substantially similar statement to determine the sub-
stantial interests of a person, and if reliance on the statement is not
permitted by subsections (4) and (5), then that person may bring an
action under section 120.535 or 120.57(1) to collect attorneys' fees and
costs. 12 The section further provides that an award shall be paid from
the budget of the secretary, executive director, or equivalent adminis-
trative officer of the agency, and the agency shall not be entitled to
payment of an award, or reimbursement for payment of an award,
under any provision of law.5 3 This attorneys' fees provision is an at-
tempt to limit occasions for an award so agencies that comply with the
law in response to section 120.535 challenges will not be penalized,
while those agencies that ignore hearing officer decisions in section
120.535 proceedings will be punished in the place where it is likely to
get the most attention: the agency head's budget.
Section 120.535, subsections (4), (5), and (6) define the nature of
the relief provided by section 120.535. They show how much section
120.535 is a compromise between the old, more rigid approach toward
requiring rulemaking that prevailed before the McDonald case and the
more tolerant approach toward agencies that refuse to make rules that
the 1991 amendments rejected. The new legislative formula tries to
capture the best of both positions. It attempts to harness the power of
147. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(4)-(5) (1991).
148. Id. § 120.535(4).
149. Id.
150. Id. § 120.535(5).
151. Id. § 120.535(6).
152. Id.
153. Id.
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challenges filed by individual litigants to move agencies toward rule-
making, much as invalidation of unpromulgated rules in section
120.56 proceedings did in the pre-McDonald era. Yet, it tries to avoid
invalidation of policy simply because it has not been promulgated.
Section 120.535 permits an agency to apply policy that has not been
promulgated, even though a section 120.535 proceeding directed to-
ward that policy is pending. This is true if the person against whom
the policy is being applied has filed a section 120.535 proceeding di-
rected at the policy. Furthermore, this is true even if that person has
prevailed in the section 120.535 proceedings, provided the agency has
formally begun rulemaking. That much is clear from section
120.57(l)(b)15., added by the 1991 amendments, 54 which attempts to
provide procedural safeguards in connection with the application of
unpromulgated policy in that situation.
The problem with this approach is that because of the limited avail-
ability of the attorneys' fees under subsection (6), the cost of any ef-
forts to reform agencies through the use of section 120.535 is likely to
fall heavily on those whose substantial interests are being determined
by agencies. Not only will those litigants bear the cost of section
120.535 proceedings, but subsections (4) and (5) and section
120.57(l)(b)15. make it so difficult for a substantially affected person
to obtain the full benefit of a section 120.535 proceeding that this new
remedy may not prove as popular in practice as it might first appear.
Who will pay to force an agency into rulemaking if they know that,
even if they prevail, the agency will be able to use nonrule policy
against them in section 120.57 proceedings pursuant to section
120.57(l)(b)15.? Those with the greatest interest in using section
120.535 will be those who have some future stake in the policy or
those who can find some way to prevent the agency from applying
unpromulgated statements of agency policy against them in section
120.57 proceedings. There are ways litigants can improve their
chances of winning something of real value in section 120.535, and to
understand how that can best be accomplished requires a discussion of
tactics as well as law.
What are the limits on available tactics? While section 120.535(8)
provides that "[aill proceedings to determine a violation of [section
120.535(1)] shall be brought pursuant to this section,"' 55 it is still not
clear whether relief is also available to challenge unpromulgated rules
through section 120.56. It is possible that section 120.535 is not the
154. Ch. 91-30, § 4, 1991 Fla. Laws 241, 249. For a further discussion of section
120.57(1)(b)15., see infra text accompanying note 173.
155. Ch. 91-30, § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws at 246 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(8)).
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exclusive remedy available under the APA to respond to an unpro-
mulgated rule. The section 120.56 rule challenge may still be available
to invalidate an unpromulgated rule on the basis that it has not been
adopted through the formalities of section 120.54. 56 While the Legis-
lature may have intended to make section 120.535 the exclusive
method to deal with this problem, it has not made the legislative ad-
justments necessary to accomplish that result. Section 120.52(8) still
defines an "[i]nvalid exercise of delegated legislative authority," the
operative language in section 120.56, to include situations where
"[t]he agency has materially failed to follow the applicable rulemak-
ing procedures set forth in s. 120.54."''  Thus, it appears that in the
case of an unpromulgated rule, a remedy still exists under section
120.56 and a substantially affected person can still challenge the rule
as unpromulgated and invalidate it on that basis.
Although this logic supports the conclusion that a section 120.56
challenge may be used to invalidate a rule simply on the basis that it
has not been promulgated, this may seem out of sync with the balance
struck in section 120.535. The difference between these two remedies
is significant. Section 120.56 provides a much more powerful remedy
than section 120.535. Once a rule is declared invalid in a section
120.56 proceeding, it may not be applied by the agency against the
successful challenger.'58 Section 120.535 provides a lesser sanction
against an agency for the same challenged policy; even if the substan-
tially affected person prevails in a section 120.535 proceeding, the
agency can use the statement against the person who has prevailed if
the agency begins rulemaking subject to the protections in section
120.57(l)(b)15. Thus, because the 1991 amendments do not authorize
as effective a remedy against unpromulgated rules as section 120.56, it
is possible that the failure to amend section 120.52(8) to delete the
quoted provision was an oversight.
There may be a way to harmonize the two provisions and give effect
to both. Perhaps the section 120.56 rule challenge is still available to
invalidate unpromulgated rules, subject to the defense that the chal-
lenged policy is not a rule, but rather an incipient policy. 159 Thus, even
156. That is, assuming the policy falls within the Act's definition of a rule and has not been
promulgated. Presumably the agency would be able to defend its position on the ground that the
policy is incipient, and thus does not fall within the definition of a rule.
157. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)(a) (1991).
158. Dore, supra note 14, at 437.
159. This "exception" to rulemaking, first recognized in McDonald, has already substan-
tially limited the availability of the section 120.56 challenge to invalidate unpromulgated policy.
The theory behind the exception is that a policy described as incipient is not a rule, and is thus
not subject to challenge on the basis it has not been promulgated. This exception has been ex-
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if section 120.56 has vitality in this area, it has a very narrow reach.
Section 120.535 may have a broader reach as it is available against all
agency policy, even incipient policy. In a section 120.535 proceeding,
the agency cannot merely say "incipient policy." The burden is on the
agency to prove one of the available defenses to the action. Even if
the policy is incipient, it may or may not qualify for one of the excep-
tions. Section 120.535 was designed to change the status quo, so not
all policy that was permitted to exist as nonrule policy by the courts
prior to the 1991 amendments will qualify for the exceptions in section
120.535. Thus, the section 120.535 remedy may be weaker but
broader, while the section 120.56 remedy may be narrower but more
powerful.
Therefore, even if section 120.52(8)(a) is amended by withdrawing
the right to file section 120.56 challenges to unpromulgated rules on
the ground that they have not been adopted through the procedures
outlined in section 120.54, challenges against unpromulgated rules
should still be permitted under section 120.56 based upon the other
grounds enumerated in section 120.52(8). For example, even if an un-
promulgated rule may not be challenged through section 120.56 on the
ground that it has not been promulgated, challenge should be permit-
ted on the basis that the unpromulgated rule is beyond the agency's
delegated legislative authority.
One problem in permitting broad use of the section 120.56 chal-
lenge against unpromulgated rules on a basis other than the fact the
rule was not properly promulgated may arise from some of the lan-
guage contained in section 120.52(8)(b)-(e). This section now defines
what is meant by the phrase "invalid exercise of delegated legislative
authority." Before the amendment that added this definition, the
phrase was undefined and could more easily be applied to unpromul-
gated rules. Now, two important subsections in 120.52(8) refer to mat-
ters that appear only in promulgated rules. Subsections (b) and (c),
which define the phrase to include the situations where an agency ex-
ceeds its grant of rulemaking authority and where the rule enlarges,
modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented,
both end with the phrase "citation to which is required by s.
120.54(7)."160 Does this mean to suggest that section 120.56 may not
be used to challenge unpromulgated rules on these grounds, or is this
panded by the courts to the point where it has virtually swallowed the rule. See Dore, Agenda
and Report, supra note 5, at 710. Because the 1991 amendments are a clear rejection of that
approach, perhaps the courts will be inclined to narrow the incipient policy exception in the
future. While this exception has no application in the § 120.535 context, it may still have appli-
cation in the §§ 120.56 and 120.57(2) contexts. See infra text accompanying note 177.
160. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)(b), (c) (1991).
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just a reminder that when rules are promulgated, the failure to include
this information may provide grounds for invalidation? I think that it
is clearly the latter, but the question remains unresolved. This is an
important question because subsections (b) and (c) would most likely
be relied on to challenge an unpromulgated statement on the basis
that it exceeds an agency's authority or is contrary to law.
It makes sense to permit section 120.56 rule challenges directly
against unpromulgated statements that fit the definition of a rule. The
restriction of section 120.56 rule challenges to promulgated rules
would conflict with the Act's definition of rules in terms of their
effect, rather than the formalities of their adoption. 6 ' Section 120.56
rule challenges have an important role in this area, for reasons that
will become clear in the following discussion of tactics. 162 Rule chal-
lenges have not been rendered unnecessary by the 1991 amendment of
section 120.57 adding section 120.57(l)(b)15.1 a While that section
may guarantee that some of the matters that can be raised in rule chal-
lenges can also be raised in the 120.57 context, section 120.57 is not an
acceptable substitute for a section 120.56 rule challenge. Even though
that section may somehow change the way agencies must treat DOAH
hearing officer findings when agencies formulate final orders,'" a
DOAH hearing officer has final order authority only in a section
120.56 rule challenge, not in a section 120.57 proceeding. That differ-
ence makes section 120.56 the more powerful remedy.
Litigation tactics may play a more important role in section 120.535
proceedings than in other areas of Florida administrative practice be-
cause the remedy provided by the section is so weak. Even if an indi-
vidual wins a final order in the section 120.535 proceeding, the agency
can proceed to use its unpromulgated statement against the successful
party in the section 120.57 context, provided it begins the formal rule-
making process to adopt the statement as a rule. 65 For this reason,
section 120.535 proceedings may not be worthwhile unless they are
part of a larger administrative litigation strategy.
Which litigants are most likely to consider bringing a section
120.535 challenge, and when will they consider filing one? Those who
have a long-term interest in codifying an area of agency policy, such
as those who are subjected to that policy repeatedly over time, and
those who have an immediate interest, such as those against whom
161. Because section 120.54(4) proposed rule challenges are only permitted to be filed during
rulemaking, that type of challenge is unavailable against unpromulgated rules.
162. See infra text accompanying note 165.
163. Ch. 91-30, § 4, 1991 Fla. Laws 241, 249.
164. See infra text accompanying note 178.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 155-58.
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nonrule policy is about to be applied, are most likely to bring section
120.535 proceedings. Those who will be subject to the policy repeat-
edly in the future may not be that concerned that the policy may be
applied after they prevail in the section 120.535 proceeding but before
it is adopted through rulemaking, because it will soon be adopted and
the promulgated rule will govern future cases. However, this is likely
to be quite important to those who are challenging policy which is
about to be applied to them, especially where those individuals are not
repeat players. Those individuals must use section 120.535 as one part
of a larger litigation strategy if they are to get any benefit from their
use of the section 120.535 remedy.
The litigants must first determine the likelihood that the agency will
attempt to use nonrule policy against them during its determination of
their substantial interests. If the substantially affected person makes
no attempt to discover whether nonrule policy is being employed, that
fact may be discovered at the section 120.57 hearing. That is clearly
too late to derive any individual benefit from a section 120.535 pro-
ceeding because the section 120.57 proceeding will be decided long be-
fore the section 120.535 proceeding. Also, if such a proceeding is filed
at that late date, the agency may even argue that the individual no
longer has standing to maintain a section 120.535 proceeding.
Even if a litigant discovers the agency's plan to use nonrule policy
early in the controversy, either through discovery in the section 120.57
proceeding or even before a clear point of entry into section 120.57
proceedings is provided, how can the individual benefits of section
120.535 be best protected? The strategy involves several steps. First, a
substantially affected person should file a section 120.535 proceeding
against a statement upon which an agency intends to rely. If success-
ful, this will force rulemaking. Second, once rulemaking proceedings
have begun, the substantially affected person has an opportunity to
challenge the proposed rule in a section 120.54(4) rule challenge filed
within twenty-one days of the publication of the proposed rule. By
statute, section 120.535 and section 120.54(4) proceedings must each
be concluded within seventy days.'6 If an individual prevails in the
section 120.54(4) challenge, the agency should not be permitted to ap-
ply the statement in a section 120.57 proceeding decided after that
point because the DOAH finding that the statement is an invalid exer-
cise of delegated authority should make future use of the statement by
the agency impermissible.
166. Ch. 91-30, § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws 241, 244 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(2)(b),(3); FLA.
STAT. § 120.54 (1991).
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The same result could theoretically be achieved simply by attacking
the validity of the statement in the section 120.57 proceeding. Practi-
cally speaking however, the result might not be the same. In a section
120.57 proceeding, the agency retains final order authority,16 7 and it is
much less likely it is that the agency will use that authority to invali-
date its own policy than it is that an independent DOAH hearing offi-
cer will do so. For that reason, an appeal to the district court might be
necessary for the individual to win on the same point in the section
120.57 context. Because of the strict time requirements governing sec-
tion 120.535 and section 120.54(4) proceedings,'" even conducting
two administrative proceedings in addition to the section 120.57 pro-
ceeding would provide a quicker resolution of the issues than would a
trip to the district court.
The same result might be achieved even more economically by join-
ing the section 120.535 proceeding with a section 120.56 challenge,
and litigating the validity of the statement at the same time the agency
is being forced to adopt it. Section 120.535 recognizes the utility of
such an approach, and provides that "[a] proceeding pursuant to this
section may be brought in conjunction with a proceeding under any
other section of this chapter, or consolidated with such a proceed-
ing.' ' 69 In this situation, if the agency loses the section 120.56 chal-
lenge, that should end the matter and the agency should not be
permitted to either use or adopt the statement as a rule. 70 However, it
is not clear whether DOAH and the courts will permit section 120.56
challenges in such a context, although for the reasons discussed ear-
lier, they should do so.' 7'
Another strategy might be to file a section 120.56 rule challenge
against the statement at the same time a request for a section 120.57
hearing is filed. The advantages of this approach are that it is even
more efficient and economical. The disadvantages are that the state-
ment may not be as clearly in focus as it might be in a section 120.535
proceeding and the section 120.535 proceeding might be broader than
the section 120.56 remedy for reasons discussed earlier. 72 This type of
joinder is more likely to be permitted if a promulgated rule, rather
than an unpromulgated statement, is involved.
167. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1) (1991).
168. See supra text accompanying note 167.
169. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(8) (1991).
170. While the sight of a litigant simultaneously attempting to invalidate and force the adop-
tion of a statement may create cognitive dissonance, there seems to be no reason to prohibit this
combination of remedies. The petition joining them could simply request alternative remedies.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 161-66.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 158-59.
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This discussion of possible combinations is not exhaustive. In han-
dling a matter that might benefit from the filing of more than one
administrative proceeding, it is important to consider the options
ahead of time and to coordinate the different administrative proceed-
ings so they work together effectively.
3. The Creation of Section 120.57(1)(b)15.
The 1991 amendments do not forbid all use of agency policy state-
ments that fall within the definition of a rule but that have not been
promulgated as rules. Instead, the amendments provide a procedure
for using such statements in section 120.57 proceedings, despite the
agency's failure to adopt them as rules. The subsection itself provides:
Each agency statement defined as a rule under s. 120.52 and not
adopted by the rulemaking procedure provided by s. 120.54 which is
relied upon by an agency to determine the substantial interests of a
party shall be subject to de novo review by a hearing officer. A
statement shall not enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific
provision of law implemented or otherwise exceed delegated
legislative authority. The statement applied as a result of a
proceeding pursuant to this subsection shall be demonstrated to be
within the scope of delegated legislative authority. Recommended
and final orders pursuant to this subsection shall provide an
explanation of the statement that includes the evidentiary basis which
supports the statement applied and a general discussion of the
justification for the statement applied. '"
This section does not contain language included in an earlier version
which indicated that an agency statement would not be presumed cor-
rect when reviewed by the hearing officer, and that provided that any
determination shall be based exclusively on evidence of record and
matters officially recognized. 7 4 For this reason, the version as enacted
has been called a "greatly weakened" version of the subsection as
proposed.17
This provision was a substantial concession to those who opposed
the thrust of the 1991 amendments requiring rulemaking. As discussed
earlier, 76 unless a litigant is attuned to the tactical considerations that
have been discussed, an agency may, through this provision, proceed
to use unpromulgated policy against a litigant in the section 120.57
173. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)15. (1991).
174. Fla. SB 1836, § 2 (1991).
175. Dore, supra note 14, at 450.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 165-72.
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context even if that litigant has won a section 120.535 proceeding that
required that policy to be promulgated, provided the agency has be-
gun rulemaking. This undercuts the effectiveness of section 120.535
proceedings. A more restrictive approach to the use of unpromulgated
rule policy, such as a broad moratorium against use of the unpromul-
gated policy while a section 120.535 proceeding is pending or, if won
by the litigant, until the statement is promulgated as a rule, would
have been more powerful. Even a narrower moratorium against the
use of a challenged statement against an individual who has filed a
section 120.535 proceeding until either that individual loses the section
120.535 proceeding or the statement is adopted as a rule would have
made the 1991 rulemaking amendments considerably more powerful.
In addition, questions exist about section 120.57(1)(b)15. itself. The
provision is included in section 120.57(1) and refers to "this subsec-
tion. ' ' 177 DOAH hearing officers are generally available only in sec-
tion 120.57(1) proceedings. Does section 120.57(l)(b)15. also apply in
section 120.57(2) proceedings? Those proceedings generally involve no
genuine issue of material fact and no DOAH hearing officer. What
happens when an agency attempts to use unpromulgated rule policy in
that context? It appears that section 120.57(l)(b)15. may not apply. If
not, what constraints on the use of unpromulgated policy exist in sec-
tion 120.57(2) proceedings? Does the case law superseded by this sec-
tion-case law that required an agency to prove up its unpromulgated
policy-still apply in the section 120.57(2) context?
Perhaps both this question and possible result can be avoided tacti-
cally. In cases where an individual suspects that an agency will at-
tempt to use unpromulgated policy, perhaps a section 120.57(1)
hearing should be demanded. That demand is in good faith if ques-
tions of material fact can be expected to arise in connection with the
factual basis or factual applicability of the unpromulgated policy that
the agency will try to apply, even if there are no other factual issues.
Once a section 120.57(1) hearing is requested, section 120.57(1)(b)15.
will apply.
Once a section 120.57(1) proceeding begins, important questions
arise: What does the subsection's guarantee of "de novo review" by a
hearing officer mean? How is this requirement different from the
court-developed requirement that an agency prove up its nonrule pol-
icy-the requirement developed in the case law that this section ap-
pears designed to replace? Does the concept of de novo review mean
that the agency's power to modify a hearing officer's findings of fact
177. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)15. (1991).
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and/or law on any issue is limited in some way? If so, on which issues
is the agency limited in its ability to substitute its views for those of
the hearing officer?
If some limitation is intended, perhaps the most logical place to
limit the agency's power to substitute its judgment for that of the
hearing officer to effectuate the concept of "de novo" review is on
the issue of whether the unpromulgated rule policy is within delegated
legislative authority. The Act has already given final order authority
to DOAH hearing officers on that issue in the rule challenge con-
text.1 ' Prohibiting an agency from substituting its judgment on that
issue here would make it less necessary to file a rule challenge on the
issue of delegated authority to protect substantial interests. Such a
construction would create, in effect, a surrogate rule challenge proce-
dure outside the rulemaking context.
Another possible issue for de novo review could be on the nature of
the agency's unpromulgated rule. At first blush, this suggestion might
seem odd. One might assume that the agency would have expertise in
its own policy that would make de novo review inappropriate. How-
ever, maybe what this section suggests is that an agency is not allowed
to have any better knowledge of its policy than anyone else, and if it
fails to make clear its policy to the hearing officer, much as it was
required to do under the existing "prove up" case law, then it may
not thereafter reveal that policy for the first time in its final order.
Other issues may warrant de novo review as well. What they are, and
what de novo review means, will be questions for the courts.
4. 1991 Amendments to Section 120.68
Chapter 91-30 amended section 120.68 to add a new section
120.68(3)(b):
The filing of a petition appealing an order issued by a hearing officer
under s. 120.535, whether filed by the agency or any other party,
does not stay enforcement of the hearing officer's order, unless the
court, upon petition of the agency or other party, determines that a
stay is necessary to avoid a probable danger to the public health,
safety, or welfare. A stay order shall specify the conditions, if any,
upon which the stay is granted.' 79
This section is important, as discussed earlier, because of the substan-
tial difficulty of successfully employing section 120.535.10 If an
178. Id. § 120.56(5).
179. Ch. 91-30, § 6, 1991 Fla. Laws 241, 250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.68(3)(a)).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 161-72.
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agency can delay for months or years after losing before the hearing
officer by filing an appeal, then the remedy's value is further dimin-
ished. This problem is recognized in the legislative history as the basis
for this change.""' However, the constitutionality of this provision has
been questioned.' 2 If this provision is found unconstitutional and
agencies can drag out section 120.535 proceedings and delay adopting
their policies as rules for years, then the value of the 1991 rulemaking
amendments as a whole is called into question.
III. THE GOVERNOR's AGENDA
Governor Lawton Chiles threatened to veto the 1991 amendments,
but withdrew from that position after the effective date of those
revisions was changed to March 1, 1992.113 That delay was designed to
give the Governor an opportunity to seek any legislative changes he
thought necessary before the effective date.las Even though section
120.535 was the result of years of debate, there was concern in the
executive branch that this new requirement might place a significant
additional burden on state agencies. This burden could come from
both the cost of compliance and the consequences of noncompliance.
The costs of compliance would come from the anticipated increase in
the volume of agency rulemaking that section 120.535 would create.
The consequences of noncompliance would come from the problems
noncompliance with the new requirements could cause. Possible ad-
verse consequences included the expenditure of resources to defend
the failure to promulgate policies as rules, prohibitions against the im-
plementation of unpromulgated agency policies, and the award of at-
torneys' fees against agencies for repeated noncompliance with the
requirements.
The Governor was interested in softening the effect that the new
rulemaking requirements would have on the executive branch by mak-
ing a variety of changes in the rulemaking procedure prescribed by the
Act.8 5 This position was an alternative to his original plan to simply
veto the 1991 amendments. Thus, as the 1991 legislative session
ended, it became clear that some of the changes made during the 1991
session would continue to be a focus of attention in early 1992.
181. 1991 Final Bill Analysis, supra note 43, at 9.
182. Dore, supra note 14, at 446 n.70.
183. See ch. 91-191, 1991 Fla. Laws 1604.
184. Due to the press of other matters, such as reapportionment and the budget, this dead-
line did not afford much time for the consideration of changes to the APA. The 1992 amend-
ments were adopted at the end of the session.
185. See Letter from Buddy MacKay, Lt. Gov. of Fla., to Mary Figg, Chair, Fla. H.R.
Comm. on Govtl. Ops. (Aug. 14, 1991) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops.).
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That the Governor had concerns about the effects of required rule-
making came as no surprise to those familiar with this issue. The Flor-
ida APA has always provided substantially affected persons with
more procedural protection against agency overreaching than any
other administrative procedure act in the nation. 8 6 In fact, in March
1990, the Seventh Administrative Law Conference focused on the re-
quired rulemaking issue and the likely consequences if such a require-
ment were adopted. 8 7
If procedures for rulemaking and judicial review of agency rules
are not up to the task when increased rulemaking activity occurs, we
risk problems on both sides of the regulatory fence. If procedures are
too cumbersome, we risk encouraging agencies to look for ways to
avoid the new rulemaking requirements and, in the extreme, we risk
hampering the effectiveness of administrative government in Florida.
On the other hand, if the rulemaking process does not include
adequate protection for substantial interests, individuals whose
substantial interests are affected by rulemaking may prefer case by
case adjudication of policy matters to rulemaking of that kind. 88
The specifics of the Governor's response to the enactment of sec-
tion 120.535 first emerged for general discussion at the Eighth Admin-
istrative Law Conference. Participants there heard an address from
Lieutenant Governor Buddy MacKay, whom the Governor had desig-
nated to lead the administration's efforts to "streamline" rulemaking
procedure. At that Conference, specific revisions proposed by the
Governor were announced. They were earlier memorialized in a letter
from Lieutenant Governor MacKay to House and Senate leaders. 89 In
that letter, Lieutenant Governor MacKay proposed the following
changes to the APA:
1. Repeal § 120.54(4), Florida Statutes ....
2. Repeal the requirement for an economic impact statement as
provided in § 120.54(1) ....
3. Provide for application of the harmless error doctrine with regard
to rule challenges ....
4. Limit standing to challenge a rule, which challenge is based upon
186. See Stephen T. Maher, Rulemaking in Florida: An Opportunity for Reflection, FLA.
B.J., Jan. 1990, at 49.
187. "Requiring more agency rulemaking will increase the volume of rulemaking and hence
the demands on existing procedures. The increase in activity will dramatize existing weaknesses
and drive issues of rulemaking procedure and judicial review of rules to the fore." Stephen T.
Maher, The Seventh Administrative Law Conference Chairman's Introduction to the Sympo-
sium Issue, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 607, 613-14 (1991).
188. Id. at 614.
189. See supra note 185.
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the supporting documents (minority and small business impact
statement, statement of facts and circumstances, federal comparison
statement, summary of the rule, or, if its [sic] exists, economic
impact statement), to any party that can demonstrate it is
substantially affected by the adequacy of the document upon which
it is basing its challenge ....
5. Except prisoners as "parties" entitled to challenge rules ....
6. The Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC) should
be precluded from filing an objection if its objection was first raised
after six months from the time the rule became effective. It is
requested that the JAPC work with the agencies to develop standards
of review ....
7. Refine the definition of a "rule" to clarify that agency statements
that do not create legal rights or require compliance in their own
right are not rules ....
8. When a rule references a specific state statute or federal statute,
rule or guideline, it should be deemed to include the most current
version of that law.190
Professor Dore, who was the leading authority in the state on this
issue, responded to the Governor's proposals by noting that "the
Governor will have to carry the burden of persuading the Legislature
that any specific reforms of the rulemaking process designed to en-
hance administrative efficiency do not unacceptably abridge citizen
participation."191
Before each proposal is separately reviewed, some general com-
ments are appropriate. It is important to emphasize what the list did
not contain. The list did not ask for any changes in the 1991 legisla-
tion. That is surprising in light of the large number of concerns about
the 1991 amendments raised in this Article. The list also did not offer
any alternative to required rulemaking that could arguably remedy the
widespread agency failure to adopt policy by rule that the 1991
amendments were designed to address. Instead of offering an alterna-
tive approach to the 1991 amendments that would make them less nec-
essary, the Governor's proposal focused on improving agency
efficiency by weakening existing protections against unwarranted
agency encroachment on substantial interests and by making it more
difficult to enforce the protections that would remain intact.
Granted, less protection of substantial interests will make an agen-
cy's job in rulemaking easier, but only at the cost of making the
agency more likely to encroach on interests that it should respect. Is
190. Id.
191. Dore, supra note 14, at 454-55.
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that an acceptable cost? Even if less procedural protection is a good
idea, should it be done by chipping away at certain protections and
making it harder to enforce others? Or is it more logical, if the present
balance among accuracy, acceptability, and efficiency is unacceptable,
to simply adopt a new administrative procedure act, one that strikes a
different balance among these competing values? The 1981 MSAPA is
an act that strikes a more pro-agency balance. 192
The problem with this more logical alternative is political. Given the
history of administrative procedure in Florida, and the mood in the
1992 Legislature, it seems unlikely that any wholesale revision of the
Act that proposes to create a less rigorous administrative process
would be well received. Even if it were, it is hard to believe that revi-
sions to the Act that make it possible for agencies to make rules with
less care, and with less accountability for violations of established law
that occur in the process, would be in the long-term best interests of
the people of Florida.
It appears that those within the executive branch have never
squarely faced the real issue: Why have Florida agencies been so re-
miss in failing to promulgate their policies as rules? If the executive
branch can solve this problem by identifying and remedying the causes
of this regulatory paralysis, it need not worry about section 120.535.
If agencies can put their own houses in order, they can render section
120.535 superfluous.
Has the Governor's list identified the real obstacles to agency com-
pliance with the Act's rulemaking requirements? Concerns about effi-
ciency are obviously credible in the abstract, 193 but when this agenda
for reform is carefully scrutinized, is it attacking the real obstacles?
Or is the letter merely calling for a roundup of the "usual suspects?"
A careful review of the items on this list suggests that the letter largely
does the latter.
1. Repeal Section 120.54(4)
The section 120.54(4) rule challenge is an easy target for critics con-
cerned about the inefficiencies in Florida rulemaking. Undoubtedly,
this challenge is a powerful procedural hurdle that a substantially af-
fected person can place in the way of an agency seeking to adopt a
policy as a rule. Similarly, there is no question that other jurisdictions
have not put such a powerful remedy in the hands of the people dur-
ing the rulemaking process. '4 While the available evidence suggests
192. Maher, supra note 32, at 825.
193. See Maher, supra note 186, at 48.
194. See Dore, Agenda and Report, supra note 5, at 725.
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that this remedy is unique and powerful, it also suggests that the rem-
edy did not cause the widespread agency failure to adopt policy as
rules that led to the 1991 amendments. 95 Also, the available evidence
suggests that abolishing this remedy will do little to make rulemaking
more efficient. ,96
These conclusions find support in the history of the section
120.54(4) remedy and in the scholarship. Section 120.54(4) has been
invoked only about two to three times a week since 1985.11 Further,
restrictive decisions in the area of the jurisdictional nature of the filing
deadline and standing to invoke the remedy have prevented it from
becoming more available.'"
These conclusions are also supported by Professor Dore's work.,"
At the Seventh Administrative Law Conference, one topic for small
group discussion by the participants was whether the rule challenge
remedy should be retained, or perhaps should be replaced with an-
other form of check on agency overreaching. There were ten small
groups. Professor Dore reported that:
With only one exception, the small group leaders reported consensus
that the validity challenge to proposed rules should be retained. The
one dissenting group apparently did not reach consensus, but the
group leader reported some sentiment to abolish the validity
challenge to proposed rules as a way to simplify the rulemaking
process and perhaps to encourage rulemaking.2
This response is significant because of the large number of agency
lawyers who participated in the discussion and the fact that each small
group was organized to assure balance between "government sector
people and private sector people."'' After reporting various sugges-
tions for modifying the remedy, Professor Dore concluded: "On bal-
ance, it appears that most people working with this unusual
mechanism want to keep it in place.' '2
If the existence of the section 120.54(4) remedy is having a chilling
effect on an agency's willingness to put its policy through rulemaking,
perhaps that agency is concerned because its policies are invalid exer-
cises of delegated legislative authority. A remedy that prevents agen-
195. See id. at 725-27.
196. See id.
197. While no hard data exists, the best estimate available is that slightly more than 1000
120.54(4) rule challenges had been filed from January 1, 1985, through the end of 1992. Letter
from F. Scott Boyd to Stephen Maher (Nov. 25, 1992) (on file with author).
198. See, e.g., Department of HRS v. Alice P., 367 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. Ist DCA 1979).
199. See Dore, Agenda and Report, supra note 5, at 725.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 722.
202. Id. at 726.
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cies from adopting rules that are in fact invalid is not inefficient, it is
both efficient and beneficial.
Finally, even if section 120.54(4) were to be repealed as the Gover-
nor requested, the same relief-invalidation of a rule found to be an
invalid exercise of the agency's delegated authority-would continue
to be available pursuant to section 120.56, but not until after the rule
became effective. The repeal of section 120.54(4) while section 120.56
remains effective would make it easier to adopt invalid rules, but no
easier to maintain them. While the same relief would be available later
through section 120.56, the repeal of section 120.54(4) could be ex-
pected to change the dynamics of the rulemaking process in several
ways. First, section 120.54(4) challenges can delay rulemaking because
an agency must win such a challenge before it can adopt a proposed
rule. While the fast disposition of these challenges mandated by
statute ° 3 can limit the delay, agencies sometimes agree to continu-
ances in these matters because of the difficulties that the statute's
short time frames can present. Second, the availability of an invalidity
challenge during rulemaking facilitates settlement of the challenge by
making changes in the proposed rule. Changing the rule to settle a
challenge is still possible in the section 120.56 context, but it is more
difficult to make changes if challenges are not available until after the
rule is adopted.
2. Repeal the Requirement for an Economic Impact Statement as
Provided in Section 120.54(1)
Challenges to the adequacy of economic impact statements have
been used by opponents of proposed rules to stop or slow the adop-
tion of rules, or to exact changes in rules during the rulemaking proc-
ess. This is usually done by raising the agency's noncompliance with
the economic impact statement requirement as a ground for a section
120.54(4) challenge. There is no denying that, when used this way, the
economic impact statement requirement, like the section 120.54(4)
remedy itself, puts power in the hands of regulated persons. As with
the section 120.54(4) remedy, it is not clear that this is such a bad
thing.
However, whatever a person's position on the desirability of giving
regulated persons more leverage in the rulemaking process, it is hard
203. Section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes (1991), provides that challenges must be assigned to
a hearing officer in 10 days, heard in 30 days, and decided in 30 days, unless the agency agrees to
a waiver of these time limits.
204. Changes are easier to make during rulemaking because changes to existing rules require
the agency to institute rulemaking, where changes to proposed rules will not necessarily require
the agency to begin again.
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to deny that the economic impact statement requirement, as followed
by many agencies, has often proven to be a waste of effort. Agencies
have sometimes assigned the task of preparing economic impact state-
ments to unqualified individuals and the quality, and hence the value,
of many economic impact statements is suspect. For that reason, the
requirement has made some proposed rules easy prey for those chal-
lenging their validity and has not been of much use as a policy-making
tool. Thus, the proposal to repeal the requirement has merit on the
basis that the requirement should be taken seriously, narrowed, or
eliminated.
The desirability of maintaining the economic impact statement re-
quirement was another topic of discussion at the Seventh Administra-
tive Law Conference. Professor Dore reported that "there is
widespread dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs relating to
the economic impact statement requirement." 20 However, the partici-
pants at the Conference expressed no clear consensus for any single
alternative, although several possible alternatives were discussed.
While this requirement was not a clear cause of the rulemaking paral-
ysis that the 1991 amendments were designed to address, concern
about the requirement is reasonable, and the Governor's proposal to
repeal the requirement appears sound.
3. Provide for Application of the Harmless Error Doctrine with
Regard to Rule Challenges
It is not clear what the harmless error proposal was designed to
add. A harmless error doctrine already exists in connection with judi-
cial review. Section 120.68(8) provides for remand only where a mate-
rial error in procedure may have impaired either the fairness of the
proceeding or the correctness of the action. A harmless error rule also
already exists in rule challenges by virtue of the section 120.52(8)(a)
provision for invalidation of rules only where an agency has materi-
ally failed to follow applicable rulemaking procedures. Have these
provisions proven inadequate? Has DOAH been invalidating rules
based upon harmless errors? Or is this proposal merely an attempt to
permit agencies to get sloppy and avoid the consequences?
4. Limit Standing To Challenge a Rule, Which Standing Is Based
upon the Supporting Documents (e.g., Minority and Small Business
Impact Statement, or Economic Impact Statement), to Any Party
Demonstrating It Is Substantially Affected by the Adequacy of Those
Documents
To which problem is this proposal responding? Is the problem that
agencies often do a bad job of complying with these paperwork re-
205. Dore, Agenda and Report, supra note 5, at 724.
FLORIDA APA AMENDMENTS
quirements in rulemaking, and that this failure therefore makes pro-
posed rules easy prey for rule challengers? If so, why is the proposed
response to help excuse this noncompliance rather than to assure that
agencies do a better job of complying with these requirements? If
there is a consensus that particular paperwork requirements are really
a waste of effort, why not repeal them?
How serious a problem is this? How many rules are successfully
challenged because they have technical defects in the rulemaking ma-
terials? Even if the number of successful challenges on this basis is
large, an assumption that seems unlikely, what are the consequences
of these successful challenges? Could not most, if not all, of the rules
successfully challenged on this basis be successfully adopted after cor-
rection of the poorly-drafted rulemaking materials? While current law
may provide challengers with a bit more leverage in the rule challenge
process, it also provides agencies with more incentive to comply with
legal requirements. It seems that, on balance, neither is such a bad
thing.
The theme of limiting standing is consistent with how the courts
have dealt with requirements or parties they do not like. Nevertheless,
it is inconsistent with the concept of access to the administrative proc-
ess that is so central to the design of the Act. Professor Dore sug-
gested that the concept of standing should be abolished under the Act
and that administrative remedies should be even more accessible than
they now are. While some rule challengers may rely on technicalities
not designed to protect them, agencies that do their homework have
nothing to fear. Even those agencies that begin rulemaking unpre-
pared are not doomed. Once they determine what they have forgotten
to do, they can withdraw their proposed rule and begin again. Why
take the Act farther from Professor Dore's ideal of an Act without
standing to prevent this minor inconvenience? Also, it is difficult to
prove how a particular weakness in a document prepared in connec-
tion with a proposed rule will affect a challenger's substantial inter-
ests. If agencies are encouraged to shirk their statutory rulemaking
responsibilities in reliance on those difficulties of proof, then the
process itself will gradually break down as compliance becomes less
enforceable.
The reference in this section to excusing failures in the statement of
facts and circumstances is the closest this proposal comes to address-
ing what I saw as the biggest threat to efficient agency rulemaking
existing at the time the list was written: the First District Court of
Appeal's opinion in Adam Smith Enterprises v. Department of Envi-
206. See generally Dore, Access, supra note 5.
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ronmental Regulation.' In Adam Smith, the court created new re-
quirements for rulemaking. It not only added paperwork requirements
absent from the Act, but also advocated a form of judicial review of
rules that, if widely adopted, could have posed a significant threat to
efficiency in rulemaking and even to agency control over the substan-
tive judgments made in rulemaking.20 Efficiency was threatened by
the specter of "hard look" review, review that threatened to delay
rulemaking through successive appeals and remands. An agency's
control over its own policy was threatened by the possibility that
courts could remand on the basis of amorphous procedural deficien-
cies to disguise their opposition to the substantive policy judgments
contained in the rule. As is more fully described elsewhere, 2°9 these
dangers are not just hypothetical. They are based on the experiences
of other jurisdictions that have adopted the type of approach advo-
cated in Adam Smith. This kind of approach to judicial review of
rules is particularly inappropriate in Florida because our APA specifi-
cally rejects that approach in favor of an approach that places signifi-
cantly more restraint on the courts' ability to review agency policy.210
As will be discussed later,21' the 1992 amendments address the prob-
lems created by Adam Smith, although the Governor's initial propos-
als did not. The adopted solution is problematic because it takes a
meat cleaver to the Act to remove the problem created by Adam
Smith. However, the amendment that was adopted demonstrates an
awareness of the importance of preventing the Adam Smith approach
to the judicial review of rules from becoming widespread.
5. Except Prisoners As "Parties" Entitled To Challenge Rules
The Governor's agenda took a shot at one particularly easy target:
prisoners. Prisoner litigation has established some interesting law in
the rulemaking area because prisoners have been excluded from sec-
tion 120.57 proceedings and have attempted to make rulemaking pro-
ceedings do double duty.2" The wisdom of excluding prisoners from
207. 553 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). For an extended discussion of the Adam Smith
opinion, see Maher, supra note 32, at 815-28.
208. See Adam Smith, 553 So. 2d 1260.
209. Maher, supra note 32, at 815-28.
210. ;ld.
211. See discussion infra notes 275-91.
212. For example, in Diaz v. Department of Correct., 519 So. 2d 41 (Fla. Ist DCA), appeal
dismissed, 525 So. 2d 877. (Fla. 1988), the First District Court found that it was proper to raise
the constitutionality of a rule on appeal from a § 120.56 proceeding, even though constitutional-
ity cannot be determined by the hearing officer. In attempting to have the appeal dismissed, the
Department had unsuccessfully argued that the petitioner "never had any intention of success-
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so much of the administrative process is debatable, but the political
strength of the proposal was never in doubt. It was an easy win from
the day it was proposed.
6. The Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC)
Should Be Precluded From Filing an Objection Six Months After the
Rule's Effective Date
This proposal recognizes that the JAPC often takes some time to
file objections to rules it reviews. This proposal's "use it or lose it"
approach is presumably designed to make the JAPC lose it rather
than use it. As can be seen from a review of the 1992 amendments,
this proposal is somewhat out of step with the direction the Legisla-
ture is taking in the area of legislative review of rules. The trend seems
to be toward increasing legislative review of rules, rather than limiting
it.
7. Refine the Definition of a "Rule" To Clarify That Agency
Statements That Do Not Create Legal Rights or Require Compliance
in Their Own Right Are Not Rules
The proposal to limit the definition of a rule to agency statements
that create legal rights or require compliance in their own right would
presumably be used to limit the reach of section 120.535, which re-
quires agency adoption of its policy statements as rules unless the
agency can prove that one of the statutory exceptions to rulemaking
exists. Again presumably, it would do this by providing agencies with
the defense to rulemaking that a policy need not be adopted as a rule
because it falls outside the definition of a rule within the APA, a de-
fense not now included in section 120.535.
If the definition of the term "rule" is limited, what would the pol-
icy that is no longer a "rule" be called? It would not be an "order,"
but a "nonrule policy"-the very category of policy that the 1991
amendments set out to abolish. Thus, this proposal, if adopted, would
simply recreate the problems with nonrule policy that have been iden-
tified and denounced over recent years.2"3 In addition, by defining
rules in terms of legal rights, the proposal threatens to reintroduce the
rights/privileges distinction into Florida's administrative law, a dis-
tinction that the Act tried to eliminate from administrative practice in
1974. 114
fully challenging the rule in the administrative proceedings but did so solely for circumventing
the trial court so that he could challenge the constitutionality of the statute in the district court."
Id. at 670. The court was unimpressed with this argument, and this novel use of § 120.56 was
permitted.
213. See Arthur E. Bonfield, Mandating State Agency Lawmaking by Rule, 2 B.Y.U. J.
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8. When a Rule References a Specific State or Federal Statute,
Rule or Guideline, It Should Be Deemed To Include the Most Recent
Version of the Law
The 1992 amendments codified a somewhat similar, problematic
concept .21 This is another area where the question is: Why is this
needed? It seems that there is a salutary purpose in requiring agencies
to look at the ever-changing materials their rules are implementing to
see that their rules remain sensible in light of the changes in the law
implemented.
IV. THE 1992 SESSION AND THE LEGISLATION THAT EMERGED
A. The Mood
Frustration pervaded the 1992 legislative session. The Legislature
faced many difficult and divisive issues, such as reapportionment and
the budget. Also, some legislators were frustrated by an inability to
address growth management issues directly. The result of this frustra-
tion seemed to be an increased level of agency bashing. The general
theme seemed to be that every branch of government but ours is the
problem. The Legislature saw bureaucrats as part of the problem and
itself as part of the solution. The 1991 theme of making the Act work
better was replaced by a growing dissatisfaction with the whole con-
cept of giving agencies responsibilities for making rules.
There was a groundswell of support for greater legislative involve-
ment in rulemaking to prevent agency encroachment on legislative
prerogatives. This was surprising in light of the fact that the Act has
section 120.54(4), probably the strongest protection against encroach-
ment on legislative prerogatives that can be found in any administra-
tive procedure act in the United States. It is also surprising that
legislators view the Legislature as a better watchdog against agency
encroachment on legislative prerogatives than the citizens whose inter-
ests are being encroached.
The Act has traditionally addressed concerns about agency over-
reaching by combining powerful citizen participation remedies in the
rulemaking process with legislative oversight by the JAPC. The prob-
lem with checking agency overreaching through the use of rulemaking
remedies has not been that the system does not work when it is used.
The problem is that rulemaking remedies cannot always be used be-
cause the courts have created restrictive definitions of the level of in-
PuB. L. 161 (1988); Johnny C. Burris, The Failure of the Florida Judicial Review Process To
Provide Effective Incentives for Agency Rulemaking, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 662 (1991); Dore,
Agenda and Report, supra note 5; L. Harold Levinson, The Florida Administrative Procedure
Act After 15 Years, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 749 (1991).
214. Levinson, supra note 213, at 762-73.
215. See infra notes 294-305 and accompanying text.
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terest required in order to invoke those remedies 216 and the courts have
not remained faithful to legislative intent in the construction of those
remedies .217 If these problems were corrected legislatively by removing
standing requirements as Professor Dore has recommended218 and by
revitalizing the draw-out remedy as I have recommended,2 19 then the
administrative process could be more confidently relied upon to be
self-correcting in this regard.
B. The Legislation
At the end of the session, one bill containing amendments to the
APA passed.220 Each section of the legislation will be reviewed sepa-
rately.
1. Section 1:221 Changes Relating to Indexing Orders
The indexing requirement established in 1991 was amended in 1992
in one significant respect. The 1992 amendment provides:
In lieu of the requirement for making available for public inspection
and copying a hierarchical subject-matter index of its orders, an
agency may maintain, and make available for public use, an
electronic data base of its orders that allows users to research and
retrieve the full texts of agency orders by devising an ad hoc indexing
system employing any logical search terms in common usage which
216. Dore, Access, supra note 5, at 989-1117.
217. This has been particularly true in connection with the draw-out remedy, which the
courts have made virtually unavailable. For further discussion of this point, see generally Maher,
supra note 32.
218. Dore, Access, supra note 5, at 967-68 (proposing to "banish the word standing from the
discussion of the right to initiate any executive branch proceeding").
219. Maher, supra note 32, at 829-30. The draw-out provision, located at § 120.54(17), Flor-
ida Statutes, reads as follows:
Rulemaking proceedings shall be governed solely by the provisions of this section un-
less a person timely asserts that his substantial interests will be affected in the proceed-
ing and affirmatively demonstrates to the agency that the proceeding does not provide
adequate opportunity to protect those interests. If the agency determines that the rule-
making proceeding is not adequate to protect his interests, it shall suspend the rule-
making proceeding and convene a separate proceeding under the provisions of s.
120.57. Similarly situated persons may be requested to join and participate in the sep-
arate proceeding. Upon conclusion of the separate proceeding, the rulemaking pro-
ceeding shall be resumed.
For a further discussion of the draw-out's application and effect, see Dore, Agenda and Report,
supra note 5, at 727-32.
220. Ch. 92-166, 1992 Fla. Laws 1670 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 11.60, 120.52, 120.53,
120.535, 120.54, 120.543, 120.545, 120.68).
221. Id. § 1, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1671 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53).
420 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:367
are composed by the user and which are contained in the orders of
the agency. 2
22
This amendment permits an agency to avoid the indexing requirement
altogether if it makes orders available in an electronic form that can
be searched by key words. It is a creative response to the cost and
inherent limitations of paper subject matter indexes. If this solution to
the indexing problem were widely used, the Legislature would not
have to limit the types of orders that the agencies must maintain and
index. Where orders are kept and retrieved electronically, the paper
bulk of the material involved is almost irrelevant. Volumes and vol-
umes of orders could easily fit on a single compact disc. Once agency
orders are kept this way, it will be only a small additional burden to
require that all agency orders, whether final or not, whether they in-
volve settlements or not, or whether they are "precedential" or "min-
isterial," be kept and made accessible. Then, the focus will shift to
defining standards for creating, maintaining, and retrieving data in
electronic form. The Legislature should take control of determining
these standards itself.
Possibly, the Legislature will soon require agencies to keep not only
agency orders, but other agency information, in an electronic form
that would make it possible to search and retrieve information at will.
If adopted, such a system would save money and improve access. It
would save the money that now must be expended in generating paper
copies and in creating paper indexes that must be constantly updated
to be useful. It would provide more reliable access to the information
than indexes because indexes are more subject to human error than a
system of direct electronic access. The choice to stay with paper has
been one cause of the problems with access within this area.
When it is achieved, electronic access to all agency information will
have several benefits. First, such a system will make it possible for the
agency to truly know its own policy. While it might sound strange to
say it, under the present system, there is a danger that agencies may
not know their own policy. The realities of state government place
barriers in the way of even the most dedicated administrators really
knowing the nuances of the agency policy they administer. Agency
policy is not created out of whole cloth. It is the product of people
working together over time, solving the problems that arise. Changes
in administration cause changes in focus and in emphasis. Changes in
personnel cause lapses in institutional memory. Variations in the si-
222. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(a)3.).
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tuations that arise change the opportunities for policy development. It
is quite possible under the current system to see lawyers who regularly
litigate against an agency have a better understanding of the agency's
options in handling what are recurring agency problems than the
agency itself, because those inside the agency may not have been pres-
ent the last time the problem occurred. If agencies had electronic ac-
cess to their own information, they would benefit by institutional
memory equal to that of their agency specialists/adversaries.
Better access to agency information might weaken the grasp agency
specialists now have over practice before some agencies. That might
make it possible to finally achieve the APA's drafters' vision of taking
the Act away from agency specialists whose real value is what they
know about the agency and giving it back to the people. While no
system can eliminate the value of agency insiders, a system that pro-
vides access to all agency precedents makes it easier for those who are
not specialists to learn what they need to know about the agency and
its policies. A system that provides access to all agency orders will
make it impossible for the agency to shape public impression of its
policy by indexing and publishing only the decisions that it would like
the public to view as significant. The new indexing system adopted by
the 1991 amendments, especially as it is described by the Department
of State rules in this area, is particularly subject to this type of manip-
ulation?2
Finally, this section also included a technical correction. It added
orders entered pursuant to section 120.535 to the list of agency orders
that must be indexed. 2 4
2. Section 2m
Section 2 made small changes to the requirement that agencies con-
sider the impact of rules on small business. The amendment provides
that an agency may define "small business" to include more than fifty
persons, as opposed to twenty-five under the old statute, if it finds
such a definition is necessary to adapt any rule to the needs and prob-
lems of small business.
3. Section 3226
This amendment stated that the official reporters used complied
with section 120.53(2)(a)'s indexing and availability requirements. It
223. For a further discussion of this point, see supra notes 88-119 and accompanying text.
224. Ch. 92-166, § 1, 1992 Fla. Laws 1670, 1671 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
120.53(2)(a)3.d.).
225. Id. § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1671-72 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(a)-(d)).
226. Id. § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1672-73.
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was necessary because the Public Employees Relations Commission
(PERC) reporter did not meet the form prescribed in Department of
State standards, but was thought by many to be acceptable in sub-
stance under legislative standards.
4. Section 4: The Economic Impact Revision
227
This revision is difficult to understand not only because it adds a
new level of complexity to an already complex process, but also be-
cause it was a compromise between those who would abolish the eco-
nomic impact statement requirement altogether and those who would
strengthen it considerably. Nonetheless, one thing is clear: This revi-
sion will be a focus of litigation for years to come.
This revision not only changes the law relating to economic impact
statements, but also creates a "rule development" procedure that can
occur before rulemaking is formally commenced. 228 This procedure is
available at the agency's option, but if it is used, the agency must
conform with the requirements established in section 120.54(1)(c)-(e).
Notice of rule development must be published in the Florida Adminis-
trative Weekly at least fourteen days before the rule development
workshop's scheduled date,129 and notice of rule development "shall
indicate the subject area which will be addressed by rule development,
provide a short plain explanation of the purpose and effect of the rule
development, the specific legal authority for rule development, and
the preliminary text of proposed rules if available. '230
Also, if an agency provides notice of rule development and prepares
an economic impact statement, the agency must make a draft copy of
the economic impact statement available to any person who requests a
copy. 231
Although this new rule development procedure formalizes another
layer of procedure in rulemaking, it is hard to see why it was neces-
sary. Agencies could always hold workshops before proposing rules,
and many agencies have used this approach to get public input early in
the rulemaking process. While this new procedure requires longer
notice than is required for workshops as well as more information in
the required notice, the rule development process essentially formal-
izes a procedure that has been available to agencies for years. How-
227. Id. § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1673-76 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1), (2), (12)).
228. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(c)-(e)).
229. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(d)).
230. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(c)).
231. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(e)).
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ever, it has a special role to play in the new economic impact
requirements.
This revision significantly changed the economic impact statement
requirement. It deleted the requirement that a summary of the esti-
mate of the economic impact of the proposed rule on all persons af-
fected by it be provided before the adoption, amendment, or repeal of
a rule.232 While an economic impact statement need not be prepared in
connection with every rule, the requirement is retained when:
1. The agency determines that the proposed action would result in a
substantial increase in costs or prices paid by consumers, individual
industries, or state or local government agencies, or would result in
significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment,
productivity, or innovation, and alternative approaches to the
regulatory objective exist and are not precluded by law; or
2. Within 14 days after the date of publication of the notice provided
pursuant to paragraph (1)(c) [notice of rule development] or, if no
notice of rule development is provided, within 21 days after the
notice required by paragraphs (l)(a) and (b) [notice of rulemaking], a
written request for preparation of an economic impact statement is
filed with the appropriate agency by the Governor, a body corporate
and politic, at least 100 people signing a request, or an organization
representing at least 100 persons, or any domestic nonprofit
corporation or association. 233
The section also provides that "[a]n agency's determination regarding
preparation of an economic impact statement pursuant to subpara-
graph (2)(b)l. shall not be subject to challenge. 23 4 Thus, the old sys-
tem of requiring an economic impact statement in all cases has been
replaced by one where it is only prepared when the agency believes it
is necessary under the legislative standards or when it is requested.
This change will save the agency from preparing an economic im-
pact statement in connection with rules in which no one has a particu-
lar interest. However, it seems likely that, given the ease of requesting
preparation of an economic impact statement, 235 a statement will be
requested in connection with most actively-opposed rules.
232. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2Xb)).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(b)2.).
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Also, the ease of requesting preparation of an economic impact
statement belittles the statute's declaration that the agency's determi-
nation not to prepare an economic impact statement pursuant to sub-
section (2)(b)l. is not subject to challenge. This is true because it
seems likely that the agency's failure to voluntarily prepare an eco-
nomic impact statement will be used against it, but in a different way
than the drafters expect. The agency's failure to voluntarily prepare
an economic impact statement suggests the circumstances enumerated
in subparagraph (2)(b)l. do not exist. If an economic statement is
then requested and prepared pursuant to subparagraph (2)(b)2., and it
shows that the enumerated circumstances do indeed exist, the request-
ing party may argue that the agency drafted its proposed rule based
upon faulty premises and should redraft it in light of the insights
gained from the economic impact statement. A proposed rule drafted
based upon faulty premises could be challenged and thus invalid un-
der section 120.52(8)(e).
There are also unanswered questions concerning whether the indivi-
duals enumerated in subparagraph (2)(b)2. must also have standing as
"affected persons" under section 120.54(3), or whether this section
empowers those without standing to request a section 120.54(3) rule-
making hearing to request preparation of an economic impact state-
ment. The latter construction appears correct.
The revision also increased the information an agency must con-
sider when preparing an economic impact statement. The agency must
not only consider the cost of the proposed rule to the agency, but
must now also consider the cost of the rule "to any other state or
local government entities, of implementing and enforcing the pro-
posed action, including the estimated amount of paperwork, and any
anticipated effect on state or local revenues. ' 23 6 The revision also re-
quired the agency to make:
5. A comparison of the probable costs and benefits of the proposed
rule to the probable costs and benefits of not adopting the rule;
6. A determination of whether less costly methods or less intrusive
methods exist for achieving the purpose of the proposed rule where
reasonable alternative methods exist which are not precluded by law;
7. A description of any reasonable alternative methods, where
applicable, for achieving the purpose of the proposed rule which
were considered by the agency, and a statement of the reasons for
rejecting those alternatives in favor of the proposed rule.2 3
These new requirements are very similar to the 1981 MSAPA's pro-
visions governing the preparation of a Regulatory Analysis in
236. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(c)).
237. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(c)5.-7.).
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connection with rulemaking. 238 These requirements were apparently
added to force agencies to be more introspective about their alterna-
tives. It is difficult to predict whether requiring the agency to go
through these exercises will actually change agency policy judgments.
If these portions of the economic impact statement are written after
policy judgments have been made, they are likely to be written defen-
sively to protect the agency's position in litigation rather that intro-
spectively to help the agency fairly consider alternatives, thereby
raising the question of how deficiencies in the economic impact state-
ment may be used in the rule challenges likely to result. The revision
limits the grounds that may be raised in rule challenges by first limi-
ting what agency failures concerning economic impact statements are
subject to challenge or review in rule challenge proceedings, and sec-
ond by limiting standing to challenge shortcomings that may exist.
a. Challenging an Agency's Economic Impact Statement
Some agency failures are specifically made unreviewable by the stat-
ute. As was noted earlier, 239 an agency's determination regarding prep-
aration of an economic impact statement pursuant to section
120.54(2)(b)l. "shall not be subject to challenge." 2 ° The revision also
limits the grounds for invalidation of the rule based upon problems
with the economic impact statement:
The grounds for invalidation of a rule based upon a challenge to the
economic impact statement for the rule, are limited to an agency's
failure to adhere to the procedure for preparation of an economic
impact statement provided by this section, or an agency's failure to
consider informatiQn submitted to the agency regarding specific
concerns about the economic impact of a proposed rule when such
failure substantially impairs the fairness of the rulemaking
proceeding. 24'
Though this section greatly limits the nature of the challenge that
can be made, it leaves the possibility of a challenge based upon the
inadequacy of the economic impact statement for failure to adhere to
238. 1981 MSAPA § 3-105(b)(3)-(6). There are minor changes in wording in all these sec-
tions. The decision to make changes in the language of model provisions is problematic because
it casts doubt on the utility of the out-of-state case law that has developed to interpret the model
provisions.
239. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
241. Ch. 92-166, § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws 1670, 1675-76 (amending FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(d)).
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the procedure for preparation or for failure to consider information
submitted. The latter point raises the question of how much the
agency must demonstrate its consideration of the submitted informa-
tion to satisfy the requirement. Will consideration be presumed, or is
it enough for the agency to write a polite "Thank you for submit-
ting . . ." letter in response? Or must a person in a policy-making po-
sition within the agency view and consider the information at a time
relevant to the preparation of the economic impact statement? Or
must the agency respond in writing to information submitted in con-
nection with this provision in order to prove its consideration? The
history of federal rulemaking requirements, and the willingness shown
by the court in the Adam Smith opinion to draw on those precedents
in interpreting our Act, should give the Legislature pause in throwing
in such ambiguous requirements. 24 Also, how will the agency's failure
to consider be proven in a rule challenge? It is fair to assume that
interrogatories asking which agency officials considered the submitted
information will now be filed with the complaint in a proposed rule
challenge, and that those officials will be deposed to determine just
how intelligently they considered the information? And when it is
shown there were others in the agency who may have been better qual-
ified to consider the information, there will be charges of insufficient
consideration. When grounds for challenge are limited, it is a safe bet
that lawyers will make those limited grounds do double duty.
b. Standing To Challenge
The Act also limited standing to make challenges based on prob-
lems with the economic impact statement.2 3 This means that even
though grounds for challenge exist, not every substantially affected
person will be permitted to challenge. This new provision states:
No person shall have standing to challenge an agency rule, based
upon an economic impact statement or lack thereof, unless that
person requested preparation of an economic impact statement under
[section 120.54](2)(b)2. and provided the agency with information
sufficient to make the agency aware of specific concerns regarding
the economic impact of the proposed rule, by either participation in
a public workshop, public hearing, or by submission of written
comments, regarding the rule.2"
242. For a more extended discussion of this point, see Maher, supra note 32, at 815-28.
243. Ch. 92-166, § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws 1670, 1675 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(d).
244. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(d)).
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Limitations on standing to challenge the economic impact statement
in a section 120.54(4) rule challenge were apparently included to make
the strengthened provision more acceptable to those who opposed
strengthening those provisions. These limitations have certain disad-
vantages. First, the decision limiting standing by statute moves the
Act farther away from its desired destination: the abolition of stand-
ing altogether.2 45 This is particularly disturbing because it is not the
only place in the 1992 amendments that contains statutory limits on
standing.246
Second, this is further evidence of another undesirable trend-the
trend toward excusing agency violation of procedural requirements by
making it more difficult for those who are affected by that failure to
challenge it. Rather than make provisions more rigorous but less en-
forceable, it would be fairer to all concerned to judge the value of the
requirements in question. If the requirements are valuable, they
should be uniformly enforceable. If they are worthless, they should be
removed. The current approach is designed to help only those who
can afford the lawyers necessary to figure it out and employ it without
mistake. The irony is that in section 8, these same amendments ad-
monish agencies to find ways to make their rules less complex and
more accessible to the general public.247 That is one test the economic
impact statement revision does not pass.
5. Section 5241
This section created the first exception to section 120.535, Florida
Statutes,24 9 and as more agencies flex their political muscle in the Leg-
islature in coming years, we can expect this list to grow.
6. Sections 6, 7, and 8:2-6 Increasing the Power of JAPC
Sections 6, 7, and 8 of the 1992 amendments relate to the Joint
Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC). The JAPC is a stand-
ing committee of the Legislature that has been in existence since the
245. See supra text accompanying notes 206-07.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 206-07.
247. Ch. 92-166, § 8, 1992 Fla. Laws 1670, 1677 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
120.545(1)0)).
248. Id. § 5, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1676 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(10)).
249. Agency statements that relate to cost-recovery clauses, factors, or mechanisms imple-
mented pursuant to chapter 366 are exempt from the requirements of section 120.535, Florida
Statutes.
250. Ch. 92-166, §§ 6-8, 1992 Fla. Laws 1670, 1676-78 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §§
11.60(2)(k), 120.54(9)(a), 120.545(1)).
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fall of 1974.231 The Committee has the power to object to rules and to
seek their invalidation, but does not have the power to declare agency
rules invalid on its own. 2 2 The JAPC reviewed between 3600 and 4900
rules per year between 1985 and 1990.253
Section 6 of the 1992 amendments increased the standing of the
JAPC. The JAPC has traditionally had standing to seek judicial re-
view of rules it believed were in excess of delegated authority in the
courts of the state. That was expanded in the 1992 amendments to
provide the JAPC with standing to seek both administrative and judi-
cial review of objectionable rules and the JAPC has standing to sue
on behalf of the Legislature or the citizens of the state. 25 4 While this is
an expansion of the JAPC's power, it must be viewed in context.
First, given the amendments elsewhere in these revisions that may pre-
clude direct judicial review of rules,25 this amendment may be neces-
sary just to preserve the status quo. Second, the JAPC has had the
power to seek judicial review of rules for many years, but it has never
needed to exercise that authority. Given the power of the Legislature
in this process, the JAPC has been able to resolve its objections with-
out the help of the courts.
Section 7 of the amendments adds the requirement that the agency
provide the JAPC with materials prepared by the agency in connec-
tion with emergency rulemaking.25 6 This is part of the changes neces-
sary in connection with the expansion of the JAPC's authority to
include the review of emergency rules. 25 7
Section 8, amending section 120.545, not only expands the JAPC's
role to include reviewing emergency rules, it also expands the type of
review that the JAPC must do in connection with proposed rules.2"8
The JAPC must now review each rule to determine: (1) if it "is consis-
tent with expressed legislative intent pertaining to the specific provi-
sions of law which the rule implements"; 5 9 (2) if it "is necessary to
accomplish the apparent or expressed objectives of the specific provi-
251, See Levinson, supra note 213, at 756.
252. For a list of the duties of the Committee, see §§ 11.60, 120.545, Florida Statutes,
(1991).
253. Memorandum from the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee 5 (Dec. I1, 1990)
(on file with comm.).
254. Ch. 92-166, § 6, 1992 Fla. Laws 1670, 1676 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 11.60(2)(k)).
255. 'See infra notes 275-92 and accompanying text.
256. Ch. 92-166, § 7, 1992 Fla. Laws 1670, 1676-77 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54).
257. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(9)(a)3.).
258. Id. § 8, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1677-78 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.545).
259. Id.
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sion of law which the rule implements"; 260 (3) if it "is a reasonable
implementation of the law as it affects the convenience of the general
public or persons particularly affected by the rule"; 2 6' (4) if it "could
be made less complex or more easily comprehensible to the general
public"; 62 (5) if it "reflects the approach to the regulatory objective
involving the lowest net cost to society to the degree consistent with
the provisions of law which the rule implements"; 63 (6) if it "will re-
quire additional appropriations"; 2" and (7) if the rule is an emergency
rule, that "there exists an emergency justifying the promulgation of
such rule, whether the agency has exceeded the scope of its statutory
authority, and whether the rule was promulgated in compliance with
the requirements and limitations of s. 120.54(9)."26
The amendments also give the JAPC authority to request that agen-
cies provide it with information reasonably necessary to conduct its
review. 66 The JAPC is required to consult with legislative standing
committees that have jurisdiction over the subject areas pertinent to
any rule examined regarding legislative authority for the rule. 26 The
amendments also provide for additional notice where an objection is
made. The JAPC must notify the Speaker of the House of Represen-
tatives and the President of the Senate of any objection to an agency
rule concurrent with certification of the objection to the agency.2 6
Also, that notice must include a copy of the rule and the statement
detailing the JAPC's objection to the rule.2 69
It is not clear whether these changes to the JAPC's authority will
result in more aggressive action by the JAPC or whether they will fur-
ther bog down the JAPC in its rule review activities. Professor L.
Harold Levinson, author of The Florida Administrative Procedure
Act After 15 Years,27 0 was concerned that the increased volume of rule
review that would result from required rulemaking would tax the
JAPC's resources, even before the 1992 amendments placed new de-
mands on the Committee and its staff.2 7'
260. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.545(h)).
261. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.545(i)).
262. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.5450)).
263. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.545(k)).
264. id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.545(1)).
265. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.545(m)).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Levinson, supra note 213.
271. Id. at 757.
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The Legislature seems to want more involvement by the JAPC in
the rulemaking process. These amendments were foreshadowed by
some of the agency-bashing that occurred during the session, and they
were a much milder attempt at greater legislative control of rulemak-
ing than some of the other proposals made during the session.2 72 The
danger the amendments pose is that they threaten to change the JAPC
in significant ways. Presently, the JAPC keeps a very low profile.
Much of its work is done behind the scenes and focuses on technical
and substantive errors. The new review could be read to inject the
committee into reviewing a host of value judgments that traditionally
have been left to the agencies and have not been reviewed by the
JAPC. Those judgments are more likely to be the subject of legislative
debate than staff action. Thus, the amendments could change the na-
ture of the JAPC's review from staff-driven error correction to com-
mittee-member-driven policy oversight. Policy oversight will politicize
JAPC's role. If such politicization of the JAPC occurs, it could draw
the Legislature and executive branches into serious confrontations. It
could also weaken the credibility of the JAPC, which has earned
agency respect over the years by limiting its oversight to an objective
review of technical and legal requirements.
7. Section 9273
Section 9 further limits the opportunities available to prisoners to
participate in the rulemaking process. Specifically, their right to par-
ticipate in section 120.54(4) or section 120.56 challenges was with-
drawn.174 These amendments are consistent with the trend of earlier
amendments that have steadily narrowed the availability of adminis-
trative remedies to prisoners. While there are some who wonder
whether this litigation is better channelled out of the administrative
process and into the courts, the wisdom that prevailed is that the de-
nial of access to administrative process achieved here is a blow for
administrative efficiency.
8. Section 10:27s Adam Smith's Revenge
The Governor was slow to respond to the serious threat to effi-
ciency in rulemaking posed by the Adam Smith case. 276 His list of
272. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
273. Ch. 92-166, § 9, 1992 Fla. Laws 1670, 1678 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.52(12)).
274. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.52(12)(d)).
275. Id. § 10, 1992 Fla. Laws at 1679 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.68(15)).
276. See Adam Smith Enters. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 553 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1989) (which added new paperwork requirements in rulemaking while advocating a "hard
look" judicial review of rulemaking). See supra notes 207-10 and infra notes 279-91 and accom-
panying text for a more complete discussion of the problems associated with this "hard look"
approach.
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legislative proposals addressed the problem only obliquely, ' 77 and the
solution to the Adam Smith problem that was eventually developed
and adopted in this section has serious flaws.
The 1992 amendments add a subsection 15 to section 120.68 that
provides:
(15) No petition challenging an agency rule as an invalid exercise of
delegated legislative authority shall be instituted pursuant to this
section, except to review an order entered pursuant to a proceeding
under s. 120.54(4) or s. 120.56, unless the sole issue presented by the
petition is the constitutionality of a rule and there are no disputed
issues of fact.279
This provision appears to be an attempt to deal with the problems
Adam Smith created by assuring that the courts can no longer provide
direct judicial review of rules except in one narrow circumstance,
where the rule's constitutionality is at issue and there are no factual
questions. The problems with this approach are legion.
The first of several perhaps unintended consequences of this section
is that the amendment can be read to preclude direct judicial review of
emergency rules. Before this amendment, a substantially affected per-
son could seek immediate and direct review of any emergency rule in
the district court of appeal. This was true because an emergency rule
was a final order subject to judicial review under both section 120.68
and the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Section 120.68(15) has an unclear effect on emergency rulemaking
because it can be read to preclude all direct judicial review of emer-
gency rules except where the emergency rule's constitutionality is at
issue and there are no factual questions. However, with respect to
emergency rulemaking, section 120.54(9)(a)3. guarantees that "[tlhe
agency's findings of immediate danger, necessity, and procedural fair-
ness shall be judicially reviewable. "279 When read with section
120.68(15), does this language preserve the right to immediate judicial
review, at least as to the listed findings, if not to the question of sub-
stantive validity of the rule? Or is the section 120.54(9)(a)3. guarantee
of judicial review satisfied by the opportunity to challenge the emer-
gency rule pursuant to section 120.56(3) and then to seek judicial re-
view of that determination?
That substantially affected persons may challenge invalid emer-
gency rules through the proceeding authorized by section 120.56(3)
may, on some occasions at least, give little comfort if the right to seek
277. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
278. Ch. 92-166, § 10, 1992 Fla. Laws 1670, 1679 (to be codified at FA. STAT. § 120.68(15)).
279. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(9)(a)3. (1991).
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immediate judicial review is withdrawn. Even though section
120.56(3) proceedings are expedited, with a hearing officer to be as-
signed no later than ten days from filing, a hearing within fourteen
days of the officer's assignment and a decision within fourteen days
after that,2 80 DOAH cannot grant immediate relief as the district court
can in an appropriate case. 28' Because emergency rules last only ninety
days,282 this means that for a significant percentage of the rule's life, if
not during its whole life, it will continue to operate, even though it
may be clearly invalid and even though a person has followed the pro-
cedures that the Act prescribes to protect his substantial interests from
that type of violation. For these reasons, section 120.68(15) may with-
draw all or part of the direct review of emergency rulemaking that was
previously guaranteed by section 120.54(9)(a)3. and section 120.68. If
that is the case, the amendment may give substantially affected per-
sons the opportunity to argue that, in some circumstances, the APA
does not provide them with an adequate remedy and that, therefore,
some other kind of immediate court intervention is appropriate under
some other principles recognized under the case law interpreting the
Act. In other words, we may now begin seeing challenges to emer-
gency rules brought in circuit court.
The second unintended consequence of this amendment is that it
may cause the rulemaking hearing authorized by section 120.54(3) to
wither and die. Without court supervision, the section 120.54(3) rem-
edy would never have become the opportunity to "present evidence
and argument" that the drafters intended. Early in the Act's history,
there was a move to preclude the introduction of evidence at section
120.54(3) hearings and to permit only comment. Because the rule, as
adopted, was appealable in those days, the First District Court of Ap-
peal was able to review that denial and breathe life back into this rule-
making proceeding. 2 3 Agency hostility to section 120.54(3)
rulemaking hearings continues today. The hostility is clearly shown
where, even now, some agencies take literally the Court's admonition
in Balino that they must listen.28 They will listen at section 120.54(3)
hearings, but will not speak.
If no appeal can be taken from the rule, what is to prevent agencies
from taking further liberties with the requirements of section
280. Id. § 120.56(3). Perhaps if there were no factual issues DOAH could grant relief earlier
than that on motion for summary judgment.
281. Id. § 120.68.
282. Id. § 120.54(9)(c).
283. See Balino v. Department of HRS, 362 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 370 So.
2d 458 (Fla. 1978).
284. See id. at 24-25 (stating that an agency has, pursuant to section 120.54(3), "an affirma-
tive duty to inform itself to the fullest extent possible of the interest and problems of those who
seek to present evidence and argument"). See also discussion in Maher, supra note 32, at 800.
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120.54(3)? For example, agencies may take the position that, while it
is proper to call agency employees who will work with the proposed
rule as witnesses to demonstrate that the proposed rule is unworkable,
it will not issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of those agency
employees at the section 120.54(3) hearings. This refusal may prove
significant, especially when the employees work in Miami and the
hearing is held, as it usually is, in Tallahassee, because section 120.58
provides that any public employee subpoenaed to appear at an agency
proceeding shall be entitled to per diem and travel expenses at the
same rate as provided for state employees under section 112.061 if
travel away from such public employee's headquarters is required.28
What good is the right to present evidence through the examination
of witnesses if they cannot be compelled to attend the hearing where
they are needed to testify? How can a section 120.54(3) hearing con-
tinue to be valuable if the courts cannot be called upon to require the
statute's procedural requirements in that context to be met? The sec-
tion 120.54(4) remedy may be hard to employ to challenge agency
abuses in the section 120.54(3) context because the section 120.54(3)
hearing is customarily held after the deadline for filing a section
120.54(4) petition has passed. Unless some other way to challenge
agency attacks on section 120.54(3) proceedings is found, that valua-
ble source of citizen input into agency rulemaking will wither and die.
Two possibilities exist. First, a rule adopted without providing an ade-
quate section 120.54(3) hearing could be invalidated in a section
120.56 rule challenge for violation of section 120.52(8)(a). Second, the
letter denying subpoenas might be a nonfinal order appealable under
section 120.68.
The third unintended consequence of this revision is that it excludes
a class of persons-those who are affected, but not substantially af-
fected-from ever seeking judicial review of a rule. A person need
only be "affected" by a proposed rule to request a section 120.54(3)
hearing. 26 A person must be substantially affected in order to chal-
lenge a rule pursuant to section 120.54(4) or section 120.56.287 Under
previous law, even affected persons could seek judicial review by par-
ticipating in the section 120.54(3) hearing and then appealing the rule.
In fact, even persons without standing could appeal, provided the
agency allowed them to participate as parties in the section 120.54(3)
hearing. 288 If the 1992 amendment is construed to prevent all direct
judicial review of rules, then affected persons will have no way to seek
285. FLA. STAT. § 120.58 (1991).
286. Id. § 120.54(3).
287. Id. §§ 120.54(4), 120.56.
288. City of Key West v. Askew, 324 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
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judicial review because they do not have the standing required to file
rule challenges. 289
The legislative attempt to cut off review is an extreme reaction to
the real problem of judicial encroachment in rulemaking as in Adam
Smith. The concern is real. Courts that follow the Adam Smith ap-
proach should be reigned in, but all judicial review of rulemaking
should not be cut off. The Legislature needs the courts to assure that
agencies remain true to legislative judgments. A better legislative re-
sponse would be to reaffirm the limited nature of judicial review, not
to abolish review entirely.
The Legislature does not need to make up a remedy that constrains
the courts while permitting the courts to keep agencies in line. The Act
already contains the solution: sections 120.54(17) and 120.68. The
problem is that the courts have refused to give proper effect to either
of these provisions.290 The draw out, when used as I have argued it is
intended to be used, will solve the problem of inadequate records on
appeal in rulemaking. That will make the inventions of Adam Smith
unnecessary. It will provide a limited, yet adequate, record for judicial
review of rulemaking. Section 120.68, properly construed, provides
the specific legal standards that, if followed faithfully, will compart-
mentalize and constrain court review. These remedies should be clari-
fied and strengthened, because they have never been widely
understood or properly used to accomplish their potential. New reme-
dies are not needed.
This amendment is misguided and should be repealed. However,
even now, without legislative action to undo this attempted bar on
appeals from the final rule or to revitalize the draw out, there may be
ways to interpret the amendment to avoid a complete bar to judicial
review of rulemaking. Some have assumed that the amendment pre-
cludes virtually all review in rulemaking, except from orders entered
in rule challenges. However, that is not what the statute says. It pro-
vides that "[n]o petition challenging an agency rule as an invalid exer-
cise of delegated legislative authority shall be instituted pursuant to
this section." 291 Reading this literally, it does not seem to preclude
either an appeal of a non-final order in rulemaking, such as an order
denying the issuance of a subpoena, and it does not seem to preclude
an appeal of an order denying a draw out. An appeal in neither case
seeks a determination that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated
authority. It merely seeks review of an incorrect ruling on a proce-
289. That is not to suggest that this is necessarily a bad thing. The same limitations would
apply in the regime I advocate-the use of the draw out to create a record for judicial review-as
only substantially affected persons can request a draw out. See Maher, supra note 32, at 829-30.
290. For an extended discussion of these points, see id. at 805.
291. Ch. 92-166, § 10, 1992 Fla. Laws 1670, 1679 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.58(15)).
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dural point that may have impaired the fairness of the proceedings or
the correctness of the action.2 92 How the courts might respond to such
an appeal is unclear.
9. Section 11293
This section adds a new type of rule adoption proceeding for the
adoption of federal standards.29 It is problematic precisely because it
creates a new type of rulemaking procedure outside the traditional ru-
lemaking procedure established by section 120.54. Why was this
amendment necessary? Did agencies have difficulty adopting federal
standards as rules? If so, what was so difficult about following section
120.54 procedures to adopt federal standards as rules? Section 120.54
is a very flexible procedure. If no one has a problem with proposed
rules, their adoption is quite simple. If a substantially affected person
has a problem with a rule, there are powerful remedies available to
challenge that rule. But unless the rule is substantively invalid or
adopted without following proper procedure, the rule will be sus-
tained in that process. In the case of a state rule adopting federal stan-
dards, it is reasonable to assume that the rule will usually be found
substantively valid, assuming it faithfully replicates the federal stan-
dard. Thus, the concern that drove the adoption of this amendment
appears to be a concern about compliance with procedural require-
ments.
The amendment relieves the agency of the duty to prepare an eco-
nomic impact statement and other rulemaking documents. It is un-
clear why it is not a good idea for agencies to think about the effects
of standards mandated by the Congress the same way that they are
required to consider the effects of standards mandated by the state
Legislature. However, even assuming there is wisdom in excepting
agencies from these requirements, the procedure adopted in lieu of the
familiar section 120.54 procedures is a disaster waiting to happen.
The new procedure mandated for use in adopting federal standards
begins by requiring publication of notice of intent to adopt a rule in
the Florida Administrative Weekly twenty-one days before filing the
rule with the Secretary of State. 295 A copy must be provided to the
JAPC at the same time. 29 The agency head is required to consider any
written comments received within fourteen days after the date of
292. Maher, supra note 32, at 811.
293. Ch. 92-166, § 11, 1992 Fla. Laws 1670, 1679-80 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
120.543(1)-(5)).
294. Id.
295. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.543(1)).
296. Id.
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publication, but the statute provides no method for assuring that such
consideration occurs, and no response to the comments is required.2 97
If substantive changes are made, those changes must be republished.2 98
The rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to chal-
lenge pursuant to section 120.54(4). However, there is an"objection"
procedure in the new provision.299 An objection may be filed within
fourteen days of publication.3 ® It is not clear how an objection differs
from a written comment. In fact, it appears that it is a type of written
comment:
The objection shall specify the portions of the proposed rule to
which the person objects and the specific reasons for the objection.
The agency shall not proceed pursuant to this section, to adopt those
portions of the proposed rule specified in an objection, unless the
agency deems the objection to be frivolous, but may proceed
pursuant to s. 120.54. An objection to a proposed rule, which in no
material respect differs from the requirements of the federal
regulation upon which it is based, is deemed to be frivolous.3 0'
What form must an objection take? Must it allege sufficient facts to
demonstrate a person's standing to object? What if it does not? Or
what if it does and the agency finds the allegations insufficient to
demonstrate standing? Can the agency deem the objection frivolous
on this basis? If not, is the fact that an objection is deemed frivolous
the only basis upon which an agency may refuse to honor an objec-
tion? What if a person alleges their standing, or some other fact, in
their objection and the agency disputes that fact? Must the agency
give the person a section 120.57(1) hearing? If not, what type of hear-
ing must be granted to resolve factual disputes? Is there any way to
challenge the factual predicate of a rule adopted under this section? 02
The procedure established in the statute, if an objection is made
and not deemed frivolous, is that, as to those portions of the rule that
are objected to, the agency may not proceed pursuant to section
120.543, but may proceed pursuant to section 120.54.303 The result is
that, with regard to the objected-to sections, the agency will have to
prepare rulemaking documents, publish and proceed pursuant to
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.543(3)).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See Maher, supra note 32, at 811.
303. Ch. 92-166, § 11, 1992 Fla. Laws 1670, 1679 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.543(3)).
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section 120.54, and those portions of the rules will be subject to a
proposed rule challenge.3  This means that portions of the rules may
become effective while others are still in adoption. It also suggests
that agencies will have an incentive to deem objections frivolous. How
are those determinations reviewed?
The recent addition of section 120.68(15)01 to the Act could be read
to preclude all review of the determination that an objection under
section 120.543 was frivolous. A more liberal reading of section
120.68(15) could permit review of such determinations under the same
rationale advanced earlier. 06 Because section 120.54(4) challenges are
not available against rules adopted under this section, there is no re-
view available from a final order in that proceeding. Section 120.56
challenges do not appear to be precluded, and it may be possible to
argue that a rule adopted under this section is invalid because it has
been improperly adopted if an objection under this section has been
incorrectly overruled. As was discussed earlier, there is an argument
that a rule is not subject to a section 120.56 challenge on these
grounds, but the alternative remedy discussed earlier-a section
120.535 proceeding to force adoption of a rule-has more appeal in
contexts where the rule has not already been formally adopted.
The assumptions that underlie section 11 are flawed. It assumes that
once federal standards are adopted, there is nothing more to do than
adopt them at the state level. This may or may not be true. Applica-
tion of this section is not limited to those situations where the federal
standards involved are mandated. Even suggested federal standards
may be adopted this way. When a state agency follows this procedure
where it has options, it cuts off the kind of input that would otherwise
be available through section 120.54(3) and exercises its discretion in a
vacuum. As long as it does exactly what is suggested, even if other
options are open to it, it may close its ears to the helpful suggestions
of those who could suggest another permissible, and perhaps more
beneficial, approach.
This section also seems to suggest that substantially affected per-
sons have already had one bite at the apple through their opportunity
to participate in federal rulemaking. This may or may not be true. It
is certainly true that the federal government may not be as sensitive to
matters of local concern as might the state. The opportunity to hear
those concerns should not be relegated to this problematic procedure.
304. Id.
305. Id. § 10, 1992 Fla. Laws 1670, 1679 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.68(15)). See also
supra text accompanying note 278 for the language of § 120.68(15).
306. See supra notes 298-303 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The 1991 amendments may have already succeeded in forcing agen-
cies into greater use of the rulemaking process, solving what many
commentators identified as a significant failing in the administrative
process. However, just as this legislative solution has begun to work,
some are beginning to argue that the large number of agency rules
being adopted is proof that agencies are out of control and more legis-
lative control of the rulemaking process is needed. Before further
changes are made, we should decide whether more agency rules are a
sign of a success or failure, of a solution that is working, or a problem
that is brewing. Given the strong remedies against agency encroach-
ment on legislative prerogatives that are already included in the Act, it
seems reasonable to conclude, at least at this point, that more rules
are a sign of success, not failure.
The concern that agencies are usurping the Legislature's lawmaking
prerogatives is surprising, in light of the stringent protections against
encroachment that the Act provides. The rule challenge remedy is the
strongest weapon against agency encroachment of legislative preroga-
tives placed in the hands of the public in any jurisdiction in the United
States. It was designed by former Florida Senator Dempsey Barron,30 7
whose concerns about what he called "phantom government" by une-
lected agencies sounded very similar to the concerns about agency ru-
lemaking expressed several years later in the 1992 legislative session.
The stringent nature of this remedy was not lost on the Governor,
who at the same time some legislators were concerned about agency
encroachment on legislative prerogatives, was attempting to repeal the
proposed rule challenge remedy.
Many significant changes have been made to the Act in the last two
sessions. Others may be in store next session. The best way to assure
that one amendment does not work at cross-purposes to the next is to
keep focused on broad policies that underlie the Act, such as the bal-
ance of power between branches of government the Act attempts to
establish and the public access to government the Act attempts to
guarantee. Are the traditional legislative judgments on those policies,
some of which have started to erode, sound? If so, it is reasonable to
try to fix the erosion, rather than change the basic balance or retreat
from access. Many of the amendments discussed here were designed
to do just that: restore the Act's basic balance. Although some of the
amendments have weak points and areas of ambiguity, it is too early
307. Dem., Panama City, 1961-1988.
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to judge whether they will succeed in correcting the imbalances they
were designed to remedy. Some of the new remedies that have been
created can be helped along by practitioners who take full advantage
of tactics to cover the weaknesses of remedies or take full advantage
of the strength that remedies provide.
It is always fashionable to bash agencies, but the evidence does not
suggest that the system we have established for regulating agencies in
Florida is ready for the scrap heap. There are significant costs in
changing from one regulatory scheme to another. It is easier to change
the law than to change the system. Thousands of people must relearn
the system, basic issues must be relitigated and, if the new system is
created ad lib, many flaws will surface and that will cause additional
difficulties.
I outlined the issues that I see as most in need of legislative atten-
tion in We're No Angels.310 I stated there that if they cannot or will
not be fixed, and if there is a consensus that a new system is needed,
then the Florida Legislature should adopt the 1981 MSAPA rather
than try to create a new act on its own. I do not favor the balance of
power struck in the 1981 MSAPA over the one adopted in our APA. I
believe that the 1981 MSAPA has a pro-agency bias and does not re-
flect the proper balance for Florida. I recognize, however, that signifi-
cant problems can occur if we make up a new system of
administrative procedures as we go along. Some of the changes that
were "ad-libbed" during the 1992 session give graphic examples of the
kinds of problems that can be created if new procedures are made up
without adequate thought and study. Big changes, such as adoption of
a legislative veto of rules, were proposed last year and may reemerge
this year. The desire to make great changes in the administrative proc-
ess should be tempered by these concerns.
308. See supra note 32.
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